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Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, the future of NATO has been discussed 
amongst scholars. Critics argue that NATO is no longer relevant, while proponents argue 
that is still has a viable function in the international community. This thesis asks the 
question, what the United States contributes to NATO missions and what does this mean 
to NATO's future. This thesis examines NATO mission in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, looking at the background of the mission, how and why it was created and how has 
the mission evolved. The evidence suggests that since September 11, 2001, the United 
States has been retreating from the alliance. The evidence also suggests that without the 
contributions of the United States (politically, economically and militarily) the alliance as 
a viable institution is in dire straits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 3, 1949, ten Western European countries, the United States and Canada 
signed the Washington Treaty creating NAT0. 1 The purpose of this alliance was 
specifically stated in the Washington Treaty, more specifically through Article 5, which 
states "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against all of them."2 From 1949 until the late 1980s, this North 
Atlantic alliance deterred potential attacks from the Soviet Union and its satellite states. 
Beginning in the early 1990s however, NATO's future came into question without the 
presence of the Soviet Union. Yet NATO was able to develop new missions and 
capabilities that allowed the alliance to evolve within the "new" Europe. With the 
subsequent NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo it appeared that the 
alliance had evolved into a new alliance and its new Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 
appeared to be the right course of action for the alliance to remain vital to European 
security in the 21st Century. 
On September 11, 2001 however, the security of the world changed with the 
terrorist attack~ in New York City and Washington D.C., as did U.S. foreign policy. 
Critics and proponents of NATO saw the attacks of September 11th in different ways. 
Critics saw the subsequent military actions that were dominated by the United States in 
Afghanistan as a demonstration of NATO's fading efficacy. Proponents saw the 
enactment of Article 5 and NA TO coming to the United States' defense as a sign of 
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continuing vitality of the alliance m the Post-Cold War/Post-September 11th 
environment. 3 
Most of the literature since the Cold War's end pertaining to alliance formation, 
more specifically to NATO itself, has dealt mostly with either its imminent demise or its 
future prosperity. Much of this recent literature has dealt with the lack of an "external 
threat," which leads directly to the question of NATO's future and its relevance. This 
thesis will depart from this traditional literature and look more directly at NATO in terms 
of U.S. foreign policy towards NATO and more specifically the United States' 
contributions to the alliance militarily and operationally. The fundamental question to be 
addressed in this research is what NATO's future is, focusing primarily on what 
operational and military contributions the United States makes within the alliance, given 
its leadership position over the past 55 years. This research will take a much different 
approach than past scholars by looking directly at operational and military contributions 
to NATO and its impact on the future of the alliance after September 11th. NATO has 
long been a mechanism for a U.S. leadership role in European security. In the post-
September 11th environment, where terrorism has become the "external threat" to NATO 
members, it is increasingly important to the security of both Europe and the United States 
to understand NATO's future in light of the many critics who question its relevance 
today. Ultimately, this thesis examines the direction the U.S. has taken in its operational 
and military contributions towards NATO in the post-9/11 environment and what these 
contributions suggest about its future viability. 
The literature that pertains to the future prosperity of NATO fits generally into 
two fundamental arguments; those that believe NATO is no longer relevant and those that 
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believe it is. These arguments can be placed chronologically into three different periods. 
The first scholars are very critical of NATO's future arguing that the alliance has seen 
better days and will soon meet its demise. These scholars were loudest in the early 1990s 
soon after the fall of the Soviet block. In the subsequent years, after NATO adopted a 
new Strategic Concept and expanded its membership for the first time since the end of 
the Cold War, these scholars began to quiet.4 At this time other scholars began to argue 
that because NATO was able to evolve in the new international environment it would be 
able to continue as an important vehicle for European security. However, the scholars 
that believed that NATO is no longer relevant have once again resurfaced after the 
alliance's problems in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq. This thesis is important because 
now more than ever the future of the alliance is being questioned. The literature 
pertaining to NATO's evolution as well as the literature calling for its complete collapse 
will be tested through three case studies explained below. Essentially, these cases will 
examine how the U.S. worked within the NATO structure to accomplish these missions. 
Three case studies will be examined to help shed some light on the U.S./NATO 
relationship in the post-September 11th environment. The first case will examine U.S. 
operational and military contributions towards the mission in Kosovo, including 
Operation Allied Force and Operation Joint Guardian (KFOR). The second case will 
examine NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has been set up 
in Afghanistan as a peacekeeping organization. Furthermore, this chapter will include a 
discussion of the "collective defense" initiative of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
(NATO's first implementation of the Article in its history). The third case will examine 
NATO's training operation in Iraq, which will include a discussion of the relationship 
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between the United States and its NATO allies during the conflict. Each case will 
examine America's foreign policy approach towards each NATO mission in three 
categories that will help enrich the argument of the alliance's future. These three 
categories include the early planning stages of the operation (U.S. relations with it NATO 
allies), the initial establishment of the military operation itself (including the 
organizational, financial and logistical aspects of the operation), and finally the political 
evolution of the operation. 
The thesis begins with a literature review and discussion of the methodological 
approach that will be used in chapter one. Chapters two, three and four will be an 
examination of the cases, and chapter five will consist of a discussion of the findings and 
a conclusion to this research question. The research method that will be applied to this 
research is a comparative case study of the three aforementioned NATO missions to 
identify if political patterns exist that is relevant to the viability of the alliance. 
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CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Most of the literature pertaining to the U.S./NATO relationship deals with the 
U.S.'s hegemonic power and how the United States uses this power not only as a security 
blanket in Europe, but also to balance the power within Europe. 
The literature pertaining to NATO's overall future can generally be summarized 
in two distinct arguments covering three chronological waves. The first wave began in 
the early 1990s when many scholars argued that NATO had met its demise and that it 
should disband altogether. Without the external threat of the Soviet Union, these scholars 
predicted that NATO would either fall apart or become basically the shell of a fledgling 
alliance. The second wave began around the time of the first round of NA TO expansion, 
where proponents of NATO began to argue that the institutionalization of NATO had 
allowed it to persevere.5 However, more recently since the terrorist events of September 
11, 2001, and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, critics have once again began to 
argue that NA TO is no more than a "shell" of its former self and its demise is inevitable. 
This newest literature pertaining to the future of NATO argues that even if NATO 
continues to exist, it will be only the shell of a former alliance that will undermine its 
credibility.6 What follows in this literature review are the two competing arguments of 
NATO's ultimate future. 
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FIRST WA VE-The Fall of the Soviet Union 
Beginning in the early 1990s, shortly after the Soviet Union's fall, NATO no 
longer had a common external threat. Therefore, according to some alliance theorists, 
without a common threat, a defense alliance will soon thereafter break-up. More 
generally, because there is no longer an external threat, member countries of an alliance 
will begin to distrust each other, which will eventually lead to its downfall.7 Along this 
same line, Mearsheimer took a pessimistic view of Europe after the Cold War, a view 
that is set to the beat of an even more imminent threat in Europe because of the Cold 
War's end. According to Mearsheimer, if NATO were to "persist on paper, but cease to 
function as an alliance," a new multipolar Europe would arise leaving no superpower in 
the region to act as an arbitrating force. 8 Because no superpower remains, Europe would 
once again become unstable because of the lack of nonproliferation and security 
guarantee that NATO provides. For instance, in a bipolar system there are two major 
powers that dominate the region and the minor powers know their place and have less of 
an influence within the system. 
A mutlipolar system however, has three or more major powers that dominate and 
the smaller minor powers have considerable flexibility when it comes to alliance 
formation or even remaining neutral. Therefore, according to Mearsheimer, with the 
imbalance of powers in Europe since the Cold War's end there is no longer a bipolar 
world. Instead a multipolar world exists which gives smaller powers the opportunity to 
defect. In a multipolar world, deterrence is much more difficult to maintain which can 
lead directly to the possibility of conflict. In other words according to realist scholars, an 
alliance will not outlive the end of threats that they were created to prevent. Without 
9 
these threats, there is no reason for alliance members to cooperate, especially if decision-
making becomes much more difficult to obtain.9 
Morgenthau adds that alliances are a necessary function for the balance of power 
in a multiple-state system, and when common interests are tentative in terms of policy, a 
treaty of alliance is required to make them precise and effective. Generally, Morgenthau 
argues, alliances are temporary in duration and are most prevalent during wartime. 10 
Furthermore, Mearsheimer argued that the Soviet Union was the glue that held NATO 
together, and in its absence, the United States would likely abandon the European 
continent all together, bringing an end to NAT0. 11 
Within this same school of thought, Walt's balance-of-power theory of alliance 
formation provides another explanation for NATO's role in Western European security 
since the beginning of the Cold War. According to balance of power theory, states form 
alliances because they do not want others to achieve a dominant position in the 
international system. Balance-of-power theory predicts that a decline in the Soviet threat 
will lead NATO to devote less effort to deterring a direct military challenge, alliance 
cohesion will decline, and bargaining within the alliance will become more intense. He 
argues that if the alliance lacks an external threat to deter, a decrease in alliance cohesion 
is likely. However, Walt argues that NATO has been able to increase the stability of the 
alliance due to its institutionalization, and that NATO is still a valuable feature to 
W E . 12 estern uropean security. 
In 1991, soon after the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent doubts of 
NATO's future, Walker argued that NATO would become virtually irrelevant to prevent 
the possibility of violence erupting in the European region. Walker argued that NATO 
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would likely be unable to take action in out-of-area conflicts because the U.S. would be 
unable to gain a consensus from its European allies. Furthermore, Walker argues that the 
expansion of NATO to include Eastern European countries would further destabilize the 
region by isolating the Russians. This expansion eastward in tum would make Europe 
less secure. 13 Critics of a post-Cold War NATO argue that the biggest challenge that the 
alliance faces is the differences of attitudes between Europeans and Americans in terms 
of global issues, including global security and out-of-area operations. 
Duffield argues that contrary to the expectation that NATO would become 
dormant at the end of the Cold War, it remains the leading security organization in 
Europe. NATO has not only survived in the post-Cold War environment, but has added 
to its organizational bodies and has undertaken new activities and missions. He 
maintains that realist theorists who argued that NATO would become obsolete have 
overlooked three important factors that have helped ensure NATO's future. First, they 
underestimated the number of sufficient external threats that justify the preservation of 
the alliance. Second, they failed to consider NA TO' s capacity for institutional 
adaptation. Finally, they overlooked the intra-alliance functions that the alliance has 
always performed even during the Cold War. These functions would include the 
stabilization of Western Europe by ensuring that past rival states would not war with each 
other. 14 
Furthermore, Glaser argues that NATO continues to play an important role in the 
security of the European continent. He argues that the new European institutions will not 
be up to the tasks that the new post-Cold War environment brings with it. 15 NATO in the 
post-Cold War era will play a valuable role in preventing a resurgent Russia from 
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appearing, it can be used as a vehicle for providing a security guarantee for Eastern 
European countries, and finally it can help ensure against possible security concerns that 
could divide the European powers. Although it is possible that the new European 
institutions would be able to provide this security in the region, it is impossible to down-
play the importance of the United States on the continent. Without NATO as its vehicle, 
it is possible that the United States would retreat from the region which could lead to 
instability. Glaser argues that without a U.S. presence, Western European security 
guarantees toward the East against the backdrop of a resurgent Russia would be less 
credible. Furthermore, the European Union would be unable to prevent the weakening of 
relations between the major European powers. Without NATO, the U.S. could possibly 
retreat from the region which would take away its role as a balancing power which in tum 
could lead one European power to dominate the region. 16 
Four years after the fall of the Soviet block, scholars began to argue that NATO 
has been able to remain relevant because it had been able to adapt to the new European 
security environment. Holbrooke argues that although NATO's primary purpose is still 
collective defense, new goals and programs have been adopted by the alliance to ensure 
its relevance. Programs such as the Partnership for Peace, Collective crisis management, 
out-of-area operations have all been adopted by the alliance. 17 These new programs have 
already begun to build a new sense of security in the region even before the alliance 
expanded. Even though the primary security threat to NATO has collapsed, Kaiser 
argues that NATO has been a multipurpose alliance from the start shaping and 
developing international politics since the end of the World War II. 18 He asserts that the 
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structure of the alliance since its inception remains relevant even today, and has the 
potential to shape the alliance for decades to come. 
This early literature shows that two arguments have emerged for and against the 
future prosperity of the Atlantic Alliance. It would be simple if the argument stopped 
here. By the mid-1990s it was evident that early critics of NATO may have been wrong 
in believing that the alliance would perish. 
SECOND WAVE-EXP ANSI ON? 
A second wave of literature beginning in the mid to late 1990s emerged shedding 
further light on these two competing arguments. This second wave of literature began to 
emerge about the time that the alliance expanded to include Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Critics and proponents alike saw the expansion of the alliance eastward 
to include former Soviet block countries as the turning point in the future of the alliance. 
Wyllie argued that NATO's expansion weakens an already fragile alliance. This 
new NATO is loaded with problems that further weaken the alliance. The first and 
second round of expansion have made decision-making more difficult because consensus 
is much more difficult to achieve when there are so many members. The difficulty of 
gaining a consensus is especially true when a policy objective is supported by the larger 
powers within the alliance but not the smaller less "relevant" partners. Another 
consequence of NATO enlargement that Wyllie identifies is the transformation from a 
collective defense alliance to a collective security alliance. As the alliance grows, the 
area which it must cover also grows. 19 Maybe even more debilitating is that NATO may 
take on more and more of a likeness to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
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Europe (OSCE). This transformation will likely diminish the power of the United States 
as a leader within the alliance. 
On the other hand, Lepgold contends that the expanded alliance's new 
governments will be able to provide the necessary forces to carry out NATO's new 
missions.20 Many proponents of NATO enlargement have argued that the inclusion of 
former Soviet satellite states will make it easier to spread democracy throughout the 
region. Contrary to this assertion, Reiter asserts that NATO is not a vehicle for 
democracy because of its checkered past. During the Cold War, when the alliance was a 
deterrent of Soviet aggression, some states flipped back and forth between autocratic 
governments and democratic governments. If NATO never pushed for democratization 
during the Cold War, how are we to believe that it will in the post-Cold War era where 
there is no external threat? Furthermore, Reiter argues that the costs of NATO 
enlargement are immense to both aspiring states and current members. He argues that the 
cost of enlargement and the deterioration of NATO/Russian relations should encourage 
NATO to abandon any further expansion.21 To further the critics' case against the 
prospects of a viable alliance in the future, Smith and Timmins assert that neither NATO 
nor the European Union (EU) have the resolve or the resources to provide for the security 
of Europe by itself. They contend that NATO and the EU must develop a cooperative 
and long-term relationship with each other if they want to secure the region.22 
Brown maintained that three distinct arguments came out of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. First, the Russians favored abolishing the Warsaw Pact and NATO 
altogether. Second, some assert that NATO was still needed, but primacy in decision-
making should be given to the new European institutions (i.e., the European Union). 
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Finally, others believed that America's engagement in the European theater was still vital 
to the security of the European region. In other words, NATO was a way to keep the 
United States in the region. In the end this final argument won and it was apparent that 
NATO remained the primary security organization in Europe. Brown however 
challenges that because NATO had to change its mission from a strategy of deterrence to 
a new strategy that would maintain the peace in the region, that the alliance would 
become ineffective and would undermine its credibility and durability.23 
Brown takes a pessimistic view of the "new" NATO, and contends that the new 
Strategic Concept that was unveiled at the 1991 Rome Summit is not the correct strategy 
for NATO to take if it wants to continue as a viable alliance.24 Brown asserts that 
NATO, and especially the United States, must maintain their original strategy of 
collective self-defense if it wants to continue to be relevant. The new missions he 
believes are highly problematic and dangerous and could undermine the alliance as a 
whole and eventually lead to its demise. Furthermore, Brown asserts that the best way to 
keep the United States engaged in European affairs and security is to emphasize the 
importance of both American and European interests that are at stake. This minimalist 
strategy emphasizes the vital interests, security concerns and the low costs of military 
intervention as the core strategy that NATO should conform to. Unlike Morgenthau, 
Waltz and Mearsheimer, Brown challenges the argument that NATO is not longer 
relevant, and asserts that NATO is still of vital importance to the security of Europe 
because it acts as a vehicle for the United States to remain engaged in Europe. However, 
he believes that this can only be accomplished through the development of a new 
strategy. The stability of Europe is still important because the U.S. maintains a balance 
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of power amongst Europe's larger states. This minimalist strategy Brown argues, could 
sustain NATO for decades to come. Globalizing and expanding the scope of NATO on 
the other hand will without a doubt lead to its demise. 25 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Wallander argued that NATO's institutional 
assets have allowed NATO to adapt to a changing global environment. Wallander asserts 
that NATO's high degree of institutionalization is the central explanatory factor of why 
NATO has remained a viable alliance. These institutional assets allow states to cooperate 
by providing information on intentions, establishing rules for negotiations, decision-
making, implementation, and by creating incentives for member states to conform to 
international standards for multilateral action. The core institutional assets of NATO 
were general in nature and were not restricted to external threats. Because of these 
assets, NATO has grown from a basic political commitment to an "elaborate political-
military institution" over the course of its history. NATO's daily political practices 
allowed it to adapt to post-Cold War security, as was seen during the events in Bosnia. 
During the Cold War, NATO was able to develop these general assets to deal with the 
Soviet threat, but NATO also developed practices and procedures that fostered 
integration amongst its members to deal with European security issues beyond that of the 
Soviet Union. It is because of these assets that NATO continues to be an effective 
political-military alliance. Some of the new assets that have emerged are the Partnership 
for Peace, which allows aspiring members to work with NATO in operations to gain 
inter-operatability. Also created was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 
which allows Russia to sit in on NATO meetings and gives them a veto on NA TO 
operations. Through these assets NATO has incorporated nonmembers into virtually all 
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its practices except for those involving Article 5. These assets were not created because 
of the end of the Cold War, but instead were built on the procedures and practices that 
NATO developed during the Cold War.26 
Others, such as Wallander and Kay, have made attempts at policy 
recommendations that would help ensure the feasibility of NATO's future. Kay argues 
that it is in the United States best interest to use NATO expansion as a catalyst to demand 
reforms that would make NATO relevant in the 21st Century. Integrating new 
democracies into NATO could act as a powerful force in maintaining stability in Central 
and Eastern Europe. If the United States is unable to do this, Kay argues that it could be 
NATO's "last gasp" for its future. He cautions that NATO expansion could exacerbate 
the problem of consensus building within the alliance, because it would now take all 26 
states to ratify a policy before it could be implemented. The inability of the alliance to 
come to a consensus was seen during the United States' plea to go to war with Iraq when 
Germany and France abstained from the decision. It is also evident that new member 
states are not prepared to bare the burden of NATO membership, as was seen in Kosovo 
in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001. Only the United States and Great Britain were 
prepared to project modem military power. Furthermore, Afghanistan showed that 
although NATO is growing, its deterrent functions, military capabilities, and political 
effectiveness are diminishing.27 
Kay contends that this "new" Europe will likely lead the United States to project 
military power in the world unilaterally, which will be seen in the case of the war in Iraq. 
At the same time, European powers may try to confine U.S. strength by strengthening the 
European Union as an alternative vehicle for future European security policies.28 
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Wallander makes the argument that NATO members must agree to amend the North 
Atlantic Treaty to allow for sanctions, suspension, or even expulsion of backsliding 
members. Currently there is nothing in the treaty that punishes members for not 
providing the commitments that they promised. If this is not addressed, NATO will 
ultimately decline into irrelevance. For NATO to remain strong, Wallander argues that 
membership criteria must be maintained amongst both aspirant countries and member 
countries. 29 
If there is one theme that can be drawn from the literature dealing with the future 
of the Atlantic alliance is that critics argue that a new policy development within the 
alliance will lead to its demise, while proponents argue that the same development shows 
the alliance's relevance. For example while proponents of NATO have argued that the 
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo was a success and a guiding light to the future 
prosperity of the alliance, critics have used the same crisis to argue that NATO has met 
its demise. Expansion is another aspect of the alliance that both critics and proponents 
examine. Proponents maintain that expansion will extend NATO's sphere of influence 
and bring democracy to former Soviet satellite states, while critics believe that consensus 
is too difficult to obtain with so many members. Critics also contend that the new 
alliance partners cannot meet NATO standards in terms of their military readiness and 
contributions. Furthermore, these same critics assert that while NA TO may bring 
democracy to these states there is nothing in the NATO Charter that prevents them from 
falling back into authoritarianism. 
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THIRD WA VE-POST-SEPTEMBER 11 TH 
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 the worst terrorist attacks on 
U.S. soil occurred. These events dramatically altered the sense of security in the United 
States as well as the rest of the world. While the Bush administration began to reevaluate 
its foreign policy, the U.S.'s NATO allies rallied behind them. For the first time in its 55 
year history NATO invoked Article 5, the collective self-defense clause of the 
Washington Treaty. This event and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to 
the formation of a third wave of literature. 
As seen in the first two waves, two divergent arguments emerged. Once again in 
the third wave a common theme can be seen as proponents and critics alike saw these 
crises as both an opportunity and a revelation. Proponents of NATO saw these events 
and the subsequent actions of both the United States and its allies as an opportunity for 
the alliance to further evolve in the new global security realm. This evolution depended 
on the alliance partners developing a new sustainable relationship that revolves around 
the notion that the alliance is a chosen partnership and not a necessary one. However, 
both critics and proponents alike contend that an agreement of this magnitude will be a 
difficult task for one major reason, the U.S. global vision vs. the European global vision. 
The most important reason that scholars agree upon is the divergent view of the world by 
the United States and their alliance partners. The new European vision of a new world 
order has pointed towards a pluralistic world where the U.S. would be balanced by 
regionally located powers. At the same time, the United State vision of a new world 
order is unipolar and unilateral in nature with the U.S. as the lone hegemonic power. 
These two divergent views of the new world no doubt have a great potential for conflict. 
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One of the harsher critics of NATO today is Meyer. He asserts that NATO's time has 
come and gone and there is no legitimate reason for it to continue to exist. He argues that 
for both the U.S. and Europeans, NATO is at "best a distraction and at worst toxic to their 
respective contemporary security needs. 30 Meyer goes as far as to say that the U.S. used 
the war in Kosovo and NATO's expansion as reasons to explain NATO's future viability. 
Accordingly, he believes that there are five reasons why NATO is no longer 
needed in the post-Cold War period. First, as has been suggested previously in this 
literature review, the only legitimate threat that justified NATO's existence is gone. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union there is no longer an external threat to the security of 
the ally countries. However, proponents of expansion argue that because of the 
institutionalization of NATO, the lack of a common external threat is no longer needed 
because the alliance as an institution is able to adapt to the changing global 
environment.31 Second, the "new" Europe that has evolved since the end of the Cold 
War has changed so much that it has outgrown NATO. The evolution of the European 
Union and the OSCE has made NATO obsolete. However, proponents argue that the EU 
and OSCE do not have sufficient military resources to handle any crisis that may arise in 
the region. European and U.S. leaders alike argue that the EU is not a sufficient 
alternative to the Atlantic partnership. 
Third, NATO (and more importantly the Russian/NATO partnership) has become 
less important to the security of Russia. The bickering between the U.S. and its NATO 
allies over Iraq has convinced Russia to keep the alliance at arms length, especially now 
that the inclusion of the Baltic States in NATO is very much a done-issue. On the other 
hand proponents argue that the NATO/Russian partnership is imperative to prevent the 
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resurgence of Russia as a super-power in the region. Fourth, expansion hinders more 
than it helps the current alliance members. Since many of these nations have neither the 
economy nor the military to legitimately participate in NATO operations, it renders them 
largely obsolete. While proponents argue that expansion protects the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe from an external threat, Meyer argues that no such threat exists 
rendering this argument irrelevant. Proponents attempt to further their argument for 
expansion by arguing that NATO would help to spread democracy throughout the region. 
Meyer and other critics argue that NATO has never advanced democracy. Finally, since 
the end of the Cold War, NATO's programs and instruments have expanded 
exponentially. Every summit that NATO has had since the fall of Soviet communism has 
been concerned with how to reinvent NATO in an effort to make NATO relevant again.32 
Proponents of NATO argue that NATO's institutionalization during the Cold War has 
allowed it to evolve, not reinvent, into a viable security organization in the European 
region.33 
Calleo contended that the future of the alliance depends greatly on the ability of 
the United States and Europe to find some way of accommodating each other so Europe 
can continue its integration to the point that the West can once again balance each other 
out. He believes that the European Union must develop into a cohesive body that is able 
to hold its own in this balancing act.34 Proponents of NATO have pointed to the success 
of the war in Afghanistan to show the viability of the alliance. Lansford asserts that the 
declaration of Article 5, and the subsequent allies coming to the aide of America, shows 
that the alliance is still a viable security organization in the global community. He adds 
that the alliance partners coming to the United States' aide after the terrorist attacks, 
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shows that NATO can go out of area and NATO's new strategic concept enabled the 
United States to pick and choose parts of the alliance that were important to the 
mission. 35 Critics however look at how the United States used the alliance after the 
terrorist attacks in a different way. They contend that the United States acted as a 
hegemonic power, and that the large defense gap that exists between the United States 
and its allied partners enabled the United States to manipulate the alliance to further its 
own agenda. 
Another question that is beginning to be debated focuses on NATO's purpose in 
the post-September 11th environment. Forster and Wallace contend that the enlargement 
of the EU and its expanded capabilities may lead it to displace NATO as a forum for 
negotiating the Atlantic partnership. However, NATO as a security organization, they 
argue, will continue to persist on many levels. First, they mention that the EU is not the 
proper forum to shape policy in response to international terrorism and because of this 
NATO is left as the primary security organization for both European and American 
policy makers in the fight against global terrorism. Second, NATO gives the United 
States a privileged position within Europe which could help shape the EU-U.S. economic 
relationship. Finally, they argue that NATO is a viable vehicle in extending the security 
of the European region eastward. These three, the authors argue, should keep the alliance 
in business for years to come. 36 
Thomson on the other hand argues that the divergence of strategic perspectives 
between the United States and Europe may be too large to overcome. First, in terms of 
vital interests, Europe is a regional power today, not a global one like the United States, 
which leads many European leaders to believe that there are no vital interests outside of 
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the European region. Second, the Europeans do not feel the same imminent threat that 
Americans do when it comes to terrorism. Finally, what Thomson argues is the largest 
divergence, is the differences between European and American strategy in terms of the 
role of military force. 37 While the United States has shifted its focus away from threats 
from the Soviet Union to terrorism, Europeans believe that these threats have 
disappeared. 
Along this same argument, Daalder argues that the difference between American 
and European policy is an important factor in the diminishing relationship of the alliance 
partners. He believes that NATO cannot survive the strains that it has experienced over 
the past few years. The outcome of the war in Iraq should go a long way in determining 
the alliance's future. If the United States and Europeans can agree upon policies to 
rebuild a war tom Iraq and policies to stabilize the Middle Eastern region, then the 
alliance may be spared. However, if the United States decides on a policy of 
unilateralism, the alliance may be pushed over the edge. Daalder believes the 
responsibility of salvaging the transatlantic partnership truly depends on the United 
States.38 Kolko takes even a more pessimistic view of the alliance, arguing that NATO 
has already met its demise because of the United States' decision to go to war with Iraq 
unilaterally. Kolko stresses that NATO's rationale for its existence ended more than a 
decade ago when the Soviet Union collapsed. The United States however continues to 
maintain the importance of the alliance to hinder European autonomy, which Kolko 
argues was the primary reason for its creation. Today, as the author argues, is more and 
more a multipolar world in which NATO no longer has a dominant role in. Therefore, 
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that will be measured in this thesis are the NATO missions under examination. The unit 
of analysis will be the United States contributions to these missions. 
There are a few limitations to the case study method. First, the case study method 
has a limited N, which limit the number of instances in which the researcher can examine 
their variables. Second, by focusing on a single event it is difficult to use the findings as 
a predictor to future cases. This limitation, however, can be strengthened by repetition 
(or the study of multiple cases). Finally, the selection of cases can be a weakness. The 
researcher must be careful in their selection of cases to ensure that they are relevant to 
each other. In this thesis, the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have been chosen 
because of their relevance to each other. In each case a contingent of NATO troops were 
used. Also, these three NATO missions are the most visible missions that NATO has 
undertaken in the Post-Cold War era. 
Selection of cases 
The selection of cases to address the question in this thesis was difficult in the 
sense that there are a number of different NATO programs and missions that could have 
been selected. However, it is important to answer the question of NATO/United States 
relations so the cases must conform to each other so that a relationship can be seen. In 
order to answer this question, it is important to the integrity of the research question to 
ensure that the cases are compatible. It is important that the cases revolve around the 
changes of the global environment in the Post-9/11 era. The three cases chosen are as 
follows: 
Kosovo: This case is important because of two fundamental reasons. First, it is 
important because the peacekeeping operation began under a different American 
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administration that had a different view of the world. Second, the mission began before 
the September 11th attacks and the subsequent change in the United States' foreign policy 
direction. Within this mission, the thesis will ask if the United States' relationship with 
NATO evolved after the terrorist attacks on the United States. Furthermore, the 
evolution of this mission, in regards to U.S. commitment, help to strengthen the cases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq by showing how the United States contributed to alliance missions 
before and after 9/11. The mission in Kosovo may be the strongest of the cases under 
examination in this thesis because we will be able to see how it evolved from a mission in 
the pre-9/11 environment to the post-9/11 environment. Furthermore, as stated earlier, 
this is the only mission under examination in which there were two different U.S. 
administrations. 
Afghanistan: The mission in Afghanistan is vital to this thesis because it shows how the 
United States' relationship with NA TO evolved from the peacekeeping mission in 
Kosovo, after the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This case is 
important because for the first time in its 55 year history, the alliance implemented the 
collective self-defense clause. Furthermore, this case shows how and what the alliance 
partners contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom. It also examines how and what 
alliance partners have and are contributing to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), which has been set up in Afghanistan as a peacekeeping organization. This case 
is relevant to this thesis because it was implemented soon after Enduring Freedom, led by 
the Unites States, came to an end. Also, this case is significant because it took place after 
9/11, meaning that the position and evolution of U.S. leadership can be seen in the new 
global environment. 
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the United States' continued aspirations to remam the only hegemonic power are 
diminishing and unattainable.39 
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, 
NATO's role in the global security realm was hampered by three interconnected 
predicaments. First, there was no consensus amongst alliance members on how to deal 
with the new threats. Second, the United States felt that the Europeans did not have the 
needed capabilities to necessitate going through the alliance deal with new security 
threats. Finally, some American leaders saw NATO as too tedious and unmanageable to 
subject their policy to it. They believed that the European states would bog down 
policies that must be acted on immediately.40 Despite these deficiencies, Ruhle notes that 
the 2002 Prague Summit showed that working together is still the best option for both 
sides of the Atlantic despite their disagreements on issues such as Iraq; and that 
agreement amongst the alliance members about NATO's future must remain the policy of 
the future. 
Maybe Kolko best summed this up by saying that "when the Soviet Union 
capsized over a decade ago, NATO's nominal rationale for existence died with it. But 
the principal reason for its creation-to forestall European autonomy-remains." He 
continues by saying, "there should be no doubt that the Cold War geopolitical legacies 
are ending and a new configuration of nations is in the process of being created. Military 
triumph, in any case, can scarcely be equated with political success-and it is politics that 
counts most in the long run." 41 
From these three waves of literature one major trend appears. Critics and 
proponents alike tend to argue that the same "crisis" or the same "developments" are the 
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reasons for either NATO's demise or its continued viability. Most of this literature 
concentrates on the alliance as a whole and only the more recent literature deals 
specifically with U.S. policy or U.S./NATO relations. 
This thesis makes an important departure from the traditional literature, not only 
on the transatlantic alliance, but on alliance theory in principle. This research will 
examine the American relationship towards its alliance partners. This thesis is important 
today because now more than ever the relevance or viability of the alliance is being 
called into question and many scholars believe that U.S. foreign policy since September 
11th is the reason why the alliance is so strained. This thesis will examine NATO's 
missions and the United States military and operational contributions towards the alliance 
in the Post-September 11th environment. 
METHODOLOGY 
The method that will be used in this thesis is a comparative case study of the three 
Post-September 11th NATO missions. George contends that a good case study can 
contribute to a sound theory in the field of international relations. By following a 
structured, disciplined approach to the cases being examined, the results could be used in 
the replication of future investigations. The repetition of the case studies can fit into the 
development of theory. 42 
The case study approach that will be followed in this thesis is the comparative 
method. This type of case study utilizes general variables for the purposes of description 
and explanation. This is necessary to permit the comparison and gathering of findings.43 
A major strength of this method is the intensive analysis of specific cases. The constant 
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Iraq: The mission in Iraq (Training Implementation Mission) is an important case to 
study for the purpose of this thesis because many NATO partners were against the U.S. 
led coalition that supplanted Saddam Hussein during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Again, 
this case will go a long way in explaining the new complex relationship that exists 
between the United States and its European allies. Although this is the newest mission 
that NA TO has undertaken, it is no doubt of great importance to the future of the alliance 
because it shows the relationship between the United States and its NA TO allies not only 
after 9/11, but maybe more importantly after the U.S. led war in Iraq that was not 
supported by many of the major European powers. The mission in Iraq however is also 
the weakest of the three cases because the mission is still in its infancy. This mission has 
not had time to mature and evolve like the other two NATO missions. 
In order to ensure the integrity of the cases, each case will consist of three 
sections of examination. Each case will begin with an examination of its background, 
then an examination of its creation, and finally a section on its evolution. 
Background 
This section will explain how the NATO mission was outlined to determine the 
strength and goals of the mission. This section will show what alliance partners agreed 
upon as the correct course of action to take to make the mission a success. It will also 
explain who was put in charge of the mission. This section also explains how NATO, if 
at all, became involved in the first place. 
Creation 
This section will address how many troops from each participating nation 
contributed to the mission as well as who was responsible for the setup and 
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implementation of the mission. This section will also look at who paid for the mission 
and what the United States contributed at its outset, and how the mission was organized. 
Evolution 
This section will look at how United States' leadership (most importantly 
President George W. Bush) approached the particular NATO mission. This section will 
also look at how the mission has changed by looking at how many troops the United 
States continued to supply to the mission, who was in charge of the mission, as well as 
any problems that may have or still may arise. The mission in Iraq will deviate from the 
other cases in this section of the study because this mission is just beginning to be 
implemented. This could be seen as a weakness of the case study, but I contend that the 
development and participation sections will be adequate enough in regards to answering 
my research question. 
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CHAPTER II 
KOSOVO 
KFOR 
Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population consisting of ethnic 
Albanians and a minority population of Serbians. Both Serbian and Albanian nationalists 
claim Kosovo to be their own on historical, demographic and military grounds. In the 
early 20th Century, this Albanian majority province was conquered by Serbia and 
remained a part of Yugoslavia throughout this century. In the 1960s, a movement of 
liberation was begun by the ethnic Albanians who predominantly made up the regions 
population which resulted in an autonomous Kosovo. Up until 1989, Kosovo enjoyed a 
rather high degree of autonomy in the region that made up the former Yugoslavia. 
However, when Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic brought the region under direct control 
of the Serbian capital Belgrade, the ethnic Albanian population rebelled. This rebellion 
led to the conflict between Serbian military and police forces and the ethnic Albanian 
forces. This conflict resulted directly in the death of over 1,500 Albanians and the 
displacement of over 400,000 Albanian refugees from the country.44 At this time the 
international community became alarmed that this conflict may escalate into neighboring 
countries. 
THE BACKGROUND OF KFOR 
The Dayton Accords that were signed in December 1995 laid out the boundaries 
of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia.45 However, the issue of the future of Kosovo was 
not included in these accords, and this lead indirectly to the violence that would erupt in 
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the region because the ethnic Kosovar Albanians did not get the restoration of their 
political rights that they had hoped for following the Dayton Accords. Cordesman asserts 
that NATO's use of force against the Bosnian-Serbs in Bosnia only exacerbated the 
conflict in Kosovo. After the conflict in Bosnia, many states in the U.N. began to show a 
growing resistance to what they perceived as Western attempts to use the U.N. for peace-
keeping missions to justify Western intervention. This concern by the international 
community, as well as the creation of a negotiating climate where the use of force was 
ultimately required to come to a diplomatic solution to the crisis, indirectly led to 
NATO's involvement in Kosovo.46 Therefore, the conflict in Kosovo began in an 
international environment where the international community lacked common priorities. 
Since the United Nations was predisposed to take a hands-off approach to peacekeeping 
because of its experiences in Bosnia, the conflict in Kosovo went largely undeterred. 
President Bill Clinton and his administration agreed that it was the obligation of 
the United States to intervene in Kosovo to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and 
evidence shows that this was the correct course of action. The Clinton Administration, 
especially Madeline Albright, pushed for air strikes against the Republic of Yugoslavia. 
However, the administration refused to consider the introduction of ground troops in 
order to force Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo. President Clinton also made it clear that 
the United States would participate in any peacekeeping operation if a peace agreement 
was reached between the two warring parties. He also reiterated that the United States 
would reduce its level of troop commitments when Kosovo's governmental institutions 
took hold.47 
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On December 16, 1997 the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was discussed 
by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expressing their concerns over the escalation of 
hostilities in the region which could lead to instability in the surrounding countries.48 At 
this meeting, the NAC called upon all concerned parties to find an acceptable solution to 
the hostilities. On March 9, 1998 a Contact Group issued a statement condemning the 
attacks by the Yugoslav army against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and called for 
the immediate termination of hostilities.49 Following this statement, the international 
community also began to express their concerns over the escalation of hostilities in the 
region and on March 31, 1998 the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 
1160 which condemned the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against 
civilians in Kosovo as well as acts of terrorism being carried out by the KLA. This 
resolution also called for a complete arms embargo on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia including the territory of Kosovo.50 On May 28, 1998 the NAC agreed on 
two major objectives dealing specifically with Kosovo. First, they agreed that a peaceful 
declaration between the two warring parties must be found. Second, they agreed to 
promote peace and stability in the surrounding region. In September of the same year, 
the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1199 that called for a cease fire, the 
withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces, access for humanitarian agencies, and the undeterred 
return of misplaced refugees to their homes. The next day the NAC met and declared 
that if necessary, NATO would take military action against the Yugoslav forces. On 
September 28, Milosevic issued a statement declaring victory and announced that 
Yugoslav forces would begin to pull out of Kosovo. NATO intelligence reports showed 
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otherwise and the United States began to push for the implantation of the two agreed 
upon air operations against Yugoslav forces. 51 
Because of the lack of unity in the United Nations, leaders of NATO nations 
began to realize that the burden to end hostilities in Kosovo would fall upon them. The 
decision to use force against the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo faced opposition in both 
NATO and the U.N. on legal grounds. The United States and Great Britain used U.N. 
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 as their argument that the use of force was necessary. The 
violation of Yugoslav forces of these two resolutions meant that they were in direct 
violation of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which provided sufficient grounds for the 
use of force. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel rejected this argument on the 
grounds that both Russia and China introduced statements spelling out that the two 
resolutions did not authorize the use of force. Kinkel instead made that argument that it 
is not the resolutions, but the very fact that the U.N. Security Council was unable to act in 
an emergency situation and their inability to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force 
was the reason that NATO should act.52 
In the end NATO Secretary General Javier Solana relied on four reasons to justify 
the use of force. First, Yugoslav forces failed to recognize or fulfill the requirements 
stated in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1160 or 1199. Second, Solana was troubled 
by the possibility of an imminent humanitarian tragedy. Third, Solana agreed with 
Kinkel's argument that the U.N. was unable to obtain a short order resolution authorizing 
the use of force. Finally, the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo compromised the 
peace and security of the region and NATO decided to act. Solana justified NATO's 
actions by pointing out that Milosevic had refused to accept the peace negotiations laid 
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out in the Rambouillet Accords. s3 In the fall of 1998, the violence and hostilities 
continued to escalate despite the concerns and actions of the U.N. and NATO. On 
August 12, 1998 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana issued a statement blaming 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for the continuing violence in Kosovo and stated 
that the NAC had already reviewed a range of operations and plans to bring the violence 
to an end. While it appeared on the surface the President Milosevic may have been 
heeding to the threats of NATO, under the surface the Yugoslav Army continued its 
aggression towards the ethnic Albanians. After Milosevic declared that the KLA had 
been defeated on September 28 and Yugoslav forces would be withdrawing from the 
area, nineteen Albanians were found massacred the next day. Thus, Solana argued, the 
use of force was the only way that the international community could "prevent more 
human suffering and repression and violence against the civilian population of 
Kosovo."s4 
Days later, what came to be known as the October Crisis took place where 
Solana informed the international community that NATO had made plans in direct 
preparation of air strikes over Yugoslavia. On October 12, U.S. National Security 
Advisor Sandy Berger announced that NATO was ready to conduct the air strikes to 
assure that Milosevic would comply with NATO and U.N. demands. The next day it 
appeared that Milosevic would heed to the demands of NATO when he, Solana, and 
Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark signed an agreement allowing for the 
aerial surveillance of the region as well as the creation of the Kosovo Verification 
Mission, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which 
allowed for unarmed observers to monitor the situation in Kosovo.ss 
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The October Crisis that led to the Kosovo Verification Mission alerted the 
international community to the violence and oppression that the ethnic Albanians had 
faced from Yugoslav forces. More importantly, however, a mistake was made in 
believing that Milosevic would back down when threatened by air strikes from NATO. 
Despite the warnings towards Yugoslav forces, the oppression and violence against the 
ethnic Albanians continued. While the actions of NATO and the implementation of the 
OSCE verification mission resulted in a period of peace, the fighting between the Serbs 
and Koso vars flared up once again in 1999. 
The continuous violence in the Kosovo region came to a head on January 15, 
1999 when approximately forty-five Albanians were killed at Racak. The following day, 
the NAC demanded that those responsible for the attacks be brought to justice and once 
again threatened air strikes against Yugoslav forces. On January 28, NATO issued a 
warning to both Milosevic and the KLA leadership indicating that NATO fully supported 
the political settlement that was agreed upon under the adjudication of the Contact Group 
(March 9, 1998). This agreement included the preservation of the territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the protection of human rights against all ethnic 
groups. Milosevic, once again was not alarmed by these threats and on February 16, 
1999 announced that he would not allow foreign troops into the region. The following 
day, Solana announced that NATO would be willing to lead a peacekeeping force in 
Kosovo and would take any actions necessary to ensure that a humanitarian catastrophe 
did not occur. 56 
During the year of 1998, some 1500 Kosovar Albanians lost their lives, while 
another 400,000 were forced from their homes. Concerned about a further escalation of 
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the violence in the region, the humanitarian costs and the risk that it could spread to 
neighboring countries led the international community, most notably NATO, to act. 
After months of speculation that Milosevic would address the growing concerns of the 
international community, along with the arms embargo that was implemented in U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1190 and subsequent NATO threats of air strikes, it became 
obvious that Milosevic did not take these threats seriously. These factors, along with the 
growing hostilities that the Serbians continued to press upon the ethnic Albanians, led to 
the implementation of Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999. 
On April 12, 1999, during Operation Allied Force, NATO's objectives to deal 
with the crisis in Kosovo were reiterated in a statement issued at the Extraordinary 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council and were reaffirmed by leaders of alliance 
countries in Washington D.C. on April 23, 1999. Five objectives were adopted at this 
meeting. First, Serbian forces must cease all military actions in the region as well as an 
end to the violence and oppression of Kosovar Albanians. Second, Serbian forces must 
withdraw military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. Third, was to create an 
international military force that would be present within Kosovo to ensure that the first 
and second objectives were being carried out. Fourth, refugees and displaced persons 
would be returned safely to their homes and their access to humanitarian aid would go 
unimpeded. Finally, the alliance wanted the establishment of a political infrastructure in 
accord with the Rambouillet Accords, international laws and the Charter of the United 
Nations.57 Because the United Nations lacked both unity and willingness to use force in 
Kosovo to stop the humanitarian catastrophe, the burden fell on NATO. 
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On March 24, 1999, after numerous diplomatic efforts that failed to convince 
Milosevic to end the conflict, Operation Allied Force commenced, beginning the air 
campaign in Kosovo. For the next seventy-eight days, NATO aircrafts struck strategic 
Serbian air defenses as well as Serbian strongholds. During the 38,000 sorties flown in 
support of Operation Allied Force there was not a single allied fatality. The NATO allies 
began these strikes under the assumption that it would take as little as twelve days to 
bring Milosevic and the Serbian forces to the bargaining table.58 The U.S. Department of 
Defense had this assessment of the air strikes: 
"As the peace talks broke down, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
directed that a new option separate from previous plans be developed. 
This option was envisioned to be a 2-day strike, hitting targets throughout 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an attempt to convince Milosevic to 
withdraw his forces and cease hostilities .... The limited 2-day strike with 
its two response options became the basis for new planning activities."59 
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Henry H. Shelton warned allied leaders that they "should not initiate these strikes 
unless the alliance was willing to escalate, if necessary, and persist until victory was 
secured."60 The alliance was prepared to escalate the air strikes in order to force 
concessions by Milosevic, and after seventy-eight days it was clear that the air campaign 
was effective enough to make Serbian operations in Kosovo difficult to carry out and had 
a major impact on the Serbian economy. 
In sum, the evidence suggests that the United States played a large role in the 
implementation and success of Operation Allied Force. Furthermore, the United States 
pressed for the air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet 
Accords. President Bill Clinton reiterated his support for the alliance by stating that U.S. 
troops would be involved in a peacekeeping mission if a peace agreement was reached 
37 
even before the air strikes began. 61 This evidence reiterates the United States leadership 
role within the alliance, especially considering that the Kosovo crises occurred in Europe. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented here shows that there was a large operational gap 
between the United States and its NATO allies during Operation Allied Force, and only 
Great Britain was able to contribute to the air strikes against Kosovo. 
THE CREATION OF KFOR 
Cordesman asserts that there are four reasons that in the end forced the Serbian 
forces to concede. First, the damage that had been done by NATO aircraft without a 
single casualty wore heavily on Serbian moral. Second, Serbia had alienated itself from 
the outside world because of its ethnic cleansing tactics. Furthermore, once the Russians 
joined NATO in pressuring Milosevic to accept a peace settlement it was obvious that 
there would be no outside states that would lend them support. Third, the Serbian forces 
were no longer able to engage the KLA in open combat because of the fear of exposing 
themselves to NA TO air strikes. Finally, there was the very prospect that a NA TO 
ground invasion may happen. Cordesman argues that these four fundamental reasons are 
why Milosevic came to the bargaining table and essentially ended the Serbian campaign 
in Kosovo by signing the Military Technical Agreement that laid out the plans for a 
Kosovo peace force that came to known as KFOR. 62 It was evident during Operation 
Allied Force that the United States was not prepared to put troops on the ground despite 
the wishes of European leaders. Because the United States and NATO were able to end 
the conflict in Kosovo using air strikes, it is evident that the alliance would not commit 
ground troops unless the United States did. Since the United States did not, the European 
allies were delegated to performing support mission during the air strikes, which allowed 
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the United States to perform precision air strikes without having to coordinate with many 
countries. 
After Operation Allied Force brought Milosevic and the Serbs to the bargaining 
table, an international peacekeeping operation was set up to ensure that there would be no 
renewed hostilities. This peacekeeping operation became known as the Kosovo Force or 
KFOR. KFOR's mission was to build an environment in which all citizens, despite their 
ethnic background, could live in peace and an environment in which democracy could 
begin to grow. KFOR's mandate came from the aforementioned Military Technical 
Agreement, which outlines its responsibilities.63 
The KFOR mission, which is still in place, is comprised of a headquarters, four 
multinational brigades and 1 multinational specialized unit with 36 nations contributing 
to the 50,000-member Kosovo Force. NATO troops form the core of KFOR, which was 
tasked to facilitate the return of refugees and ensure an end to the conflict in the area. 
Since KFOR arrived in the area close to 1 million refugees have returned home. KFOR 
also monitored local elections and cleared over 1 million square meters of landmines. 
From KFOR's inception till about July 2000, alliance troop levels were reduced from 
about 50,000 to about 38,000. The withdrawal of French, Russian and British troops has 
accounted for the majority of the 12,000 troops. American and German forces have 
remained relatively stable.64 
KOFR Headquarters in located in Pristina, Kosovo and supports these four brigades 
and the one specialized unit. The commander ofKFOR rotates every six months between 
Germany, France, Italy and England and reports to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied 
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), located in Naples, Italy.65 The Multinational 
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Specialized Unit (MSU) is a police force that has considerable experience in fighting and 
combating organized crime and terrorism. This unit conducts routine patrols that allow 
the MSU to interact with the community in order to deepen their knowledge of the 
criminal and security apparatuses within Kosovo. The MSU is made up of coalition 
forces from Italy (the lead nation), France and Estonia.66 
The first multinational brigade is the Multinational Brigade Centre (MBC) which is 
located in Pristina, Kosovo. The MBC is responsible for two boundary-crossing points 
and their mission is to maintain a safe and secure environment around the areas of 
Podujevo, Kosovo Polje, Lipljan, Glocovac and Stimlje. Finland, the first non-NATO 
member to enter KFOR, is the lead state. A Finnish-Irish Battle Group consists of troops 
from Finland, Ireland and Sweden and the 3rd Czech-Slovakia Battle Group is made up of 
troops from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The second multinational brigade is the 
Multinational Brigade Northeast (MBN), which is located in Mitrovica, Kosovo. France 
is the lead nation and Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Luxemburg, and Morocco 
also contributing to the MBN. Their mission is to maintain a secure environment, verify 
and monitor the Military Technical Agreement, and also provides patrols, checkpoints, 
escorts and intelligence. The third brigade is the Multinational Brigade Southwest, which 
is located in Prizren, Kosovo. The MBS lead nation is Italy, with ten other nations 
providing support for the security of the region. 
Finally, and most importantly to this thesis, is the Multinational Brigade East which 
is located in Urosevac, Kosovo and the United States in the lead nation. Armenia, 
Greece, Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine also contribute to the mission of the MBE. 
The MBE, also known as Task Force Falcon, is tasked with the monitoring and 
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verification of the provisions lay out under the Military Technical Agreement. 67 They are 
also tasked with providing support for U.N. humanitarian efforts, and enforcing law and 
order during the transition to a civil government. The United States also has about 1000 
troops deployed along the border focused on stopping the flow of Kosovar Albanian 
weapons and guerrillas into Serbia.68 Each of these brigades reports directly to KFOR 
Headquarters, which reports directly to the Commander-In-Chief, Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCSOUTH), located in Naples, Italy. However, little coordination occurs 
among the brigades, and despite early efforts by NATO to give the commander of KFOR 
control over all the forces deployed there, every brigade makes its own decisions. The 
KFOR commander also lacks the ability to draw forces from one brigade area to another 
as situations arise.69 
The command structure for KFOR is broken down into the five above-mentioned 
territorial sectors. Therefore, the United States' role in the command structure of KFOR 
rivals that of the major European powers (Germany, France, England and Italy). The 
only exception is that United States' commanders do not participate in the six-month 
rotation at KFOR Headquarters. The United States, along with the British, French, 
German and Italian contingents, are in command of their specific sector. The other 
nations' contingents are assigned to these sectors and are under the command of the lead 
nation. American troops are not under the command of any other nation except its own. 
Furthermore, the lead countries in the four sectors rarely, if ever, defer to KFOR 
Headquarters. At the outset of the peacekeeping operations that followed the NATO-led 
air campaign, the European nations indicated that they intended to play a leading role. 
However, by looking at estimations of NATO-member contributions to KFOR, we can 
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get a better picture of where the United States stands in comparison to its European allies. 
For example, the mean of the European contingents' annual expenditures is $81.2 
million. This $81.2 annually is dwarfed in comparison to the United States' annual 
contribution, which is $1. 06 billion. 70 
At the outset of KFOR, the European allies wanted to play the leading role, yet even 
when the lead countries of Italy, France, Great Britain and Germany's contributions are 
added together they still only add up to about half of the annual contributions that the 
United States makes in support of the KFOR mission. The contributions of the alliance 
members in regards to humanitarian and reconstruction costs lends further evidence that 
the United States contributed greatly to the KFOR mission. The total expenditures of the 
European allies towards humanitarian and reconstruction assistance add up to about $840 
million, just $126 million more than the United States contributed alone. 71 Despite the 
European rhetoric that they wanted to take the lead in the KFOR mission, it is quite 
evident that the United States still contributed more financially than any one country. In 
fact, the United States' contributions equal less than half of the contribution by the 
European Union as a whole. 
Where do these findings leave the United States in terms of their contribution to the 
organizational aspects of KFOR? From the evidence presented above, it can be argued 
that the United States is the lead nation in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission despite the 
absence of U.S. leadership at KFOR Headquarters. The evidence also suggests that 
without the U.S. contributions both militarily and financially the European allies would 
have had a difficult time implementing the Kosovo peacekeeping operation and 
maintaining adequate troop levels to support the mission. The United States 
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contributions to the KFOR mission can also be seen in the different responsibilities that 
the Multinational Brigade East has in comparison to the remaining four brigades. In 
addition to maintaining the peace and security of its area of responsibility (AOR), the 
Multinational Brigade East also ensures Serb and Kosovar compliance with the Military 
Technical Agreement. The MBE is also tasked with: ( 1) providing humanitarian 
assistance in support of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 
efforts. (2) Initial enforcement of basic law and order, transitioning this function to the 
designated civilian agency as soon as possible. (3) The establishment and support of 
resuming core civil functions. (4) The MBE is also tasked with controlling the flow of 
refugees between the Kosovo province and the Republic ofMacedonia.72 
In sum, the evidence shows that the United States contributes the most resources to 
KFOR, both in troop levels and financial assistance, in comparison to its European allies 
on an individual level. Also, it is interesting that the United States also is the lead nation 
in the MBE that has the greatest responsibility. 
In a November 2000 report, the EU attempted to show not only its member 
countries, but the rest of the world that they were leading the mission in Kosovo. In the 
report, they pointed out that European countries deploy 65 percent of the troops 
committed to the area while only 15 percent are from the United States.73 However, if 
the troop contributions are divided up between EU members, the United States still has 
the largest contingent deployed. In fact, of the EU states that participated in KFOR, only 
Italy, France Germany and the United Kingdom contributed troops that even rivaled the 
contribution of the United States. In fact if the troop's contributions of the other 15 
member countries are added together they make up just slightly more than the U.S. 
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contingent. 74 This is contrary to Defense Secretary William Cohen's assertion that the 
burden should fall more on the shoulders of the Europeans than it should on the United 
States. 
The KFOR data details the contributions made by the Europeans in support of 
Operation Allied Force which has been seen as a successful NATO mission in which all 
nineteen NATO members made some contribution to the alliance, whether it was 
politically, militarily, or economically. However, this operation highlighted the 
disparities that exist between the United States and its NATO allies. These disparities 
include, but are not limited to, space-based surveillance, large deck carrier operations, 
strategic airlift, radar-defeating stealth aircraft, mid-altitude reconnaissance and strike 
capabilities during times when visibility was reduced. Nardulli, et al assert that these 
disparities were so substantial that it created an impression that NATO was no more than 
a cover for what was essentially a U.S. mission.75 
Again, much like in the organization of KFOR, the United States' military 
contributions cannot be understated. Of all the NA TO allies deployed in the AOR, the 
United States troop contribution of 5,600 is the largest.76 In addition to the 5,600 troops 
that the United States had stationed in their brigade area, there were an additional 1000 
troops stationed on the Macedonian and Albanian borders to ensure that KLA troops, 
Serbian troops and refugees did not spread into the neighboring countries. The United 
States makes up 18 percent of the total NA TO deployment, while France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom average about 13.5 percent of the total NATO deployment. As 
mentioned earlier, the European Union made it clear that they have contributed 65 
percent of the troops deployed in support of KFOR.77 Although the United States was 
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not the "lead nation" per se, they certainly have contributed more militarily than any 
other country that is participating in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. 
Despite the United State's larger than expected contribution to the mission in 
Kosovo, NATO allies and non-NATO partners worked well together in achieving the 
military objectives that were assigned to them by NAC. In spite of these contributions 
from both member and non-members of NATO, Operation Allied Force and KFOR 
highlighted a number of gaps that exists between U.S. capabilities and those of its NATO 
allies. Deficiencies such as space-based surveillance, large deck carrier operations, 
strategic airlift, radar-defeating stealth aircraft, mid-altitude reconnaissance and strike 
capabilities during times when visibility was reduced, impeded U.S. forces' abilities to 
operate at an optimal level of effectiveness by impeding U.S. military commanders 
selecting targets. During the early stages of KFOR, alliance member's insufficient air 
mobility assets slowed the implementation of KFOR after Milosevic conceded to the 
alliance's demands.78 In the future the deficiencies that exist between the United States 
and its NATO allies will challenge its military effectiveness and its ability to operate as 
an effective alliance. 
Unlike Operation Allied Force, burdensharing amongst the allies has been 
relatively equal. Although the United States has more troops deployed to Kosovo than 
any other country, it has become quite evident that the European powers and the 
European Union specifically, have taken on their share of the burden in terms of 
monetary and military contributions. In terms of the logistical setup of KFOR, all 
alliance members (some more than others) have contributed to the brigade that the NAC 
had placed them under. Furthermore, the United States' leadership, more specifically the 
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Clinton Administration, believed that the United States and the European Union must 
work together to rebuild the peace in the area. The Clinton Administration made it clear 
at the outset of NATO's involvement in Kosovo that "Europe must provide most of the 
resources," this however is not the case as the United States contributed more resources 
than any other ally. 79 If the European continent is taken in as a whole, then yes they did 
provide most of the resources. 
The United States contributed more resources to the KFOR mission than any 
other alliance member, militarily, logistically and monetarily. The Clinton Administration 
made it clear that Europe must provide most of the resources for this peacekeeping 
mission. However, the United States still contributed the most, minus the European 
Unions contributions, to the KFOR mission. Additionally, the United States was the lead 
nation for the multinational brigade that was tasked with protecting arms and refuge flow. 
The evidence suggests that without the United States contributions to KFOR, it is likely 
that other alliance members would not have contributed enough to implement the 
mission. 
THE EVOLUTION OF KFOR 
Now that the background for the KFOR mission has been outlined, it is important 
to look at how it has evolved over the past few years, and what President George W. 
Bush's administration believes to be the right course of action in regards to the 
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, President Bush has had more 
pressing issues to deal with. During President Bush's 2000 presidential campaign, he 
said that keeping the peace in the troubled region is a European, not American, 
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responsibility. Furthermore, President Bush's National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice said that the United States military was overextended globally and therefore the 
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo should be taken over by its European allies.80 After 
taking office, the Bush Administration adopted a more cautious tone and in 2001, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States was reviewing U.S. troop levels in 
Bosnia and Kosovo with the objective ofreducing them over time, but wanted to stress to 
its NATO partners that the United States was not cutting and running.81 Secretary of 
State Colin Powell also stated in February 2001 that the United States had a commitment 
to the peace in Kosovo and would continue its presence in the Balkans. 82 In a June 2001 
visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, President Bush reiterated the U.S. position 
stating, "We understand that America's contribution is essential, both militarily and 
politically. We will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or 
unilaterally. We came in together, and we will go out together."83 The Bush 
Administration made it clear that they would review U.S. troop levels in Kosovo with the 
objective of reducing them over time, but reiterated to its alliance partners that they 
would not simply cut and run. In a July 24, 2001 visit by President Bush to U.S. troops 
in Kosovo, the president stated: 
We will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or 
unilaterally .... but our goal is to hasten the day when peace is self-
sustaining ... and when NATO's forces can go home. NATO's 
commitment to the peace of this region is enduring, but the stationing of 
our forces here should not be indefinite."84 
In 2002, President Bush also reiterated to both the House and Senate foreign relations 
committees "that the Europeans have carried a significant portion of the aid-sharing 
burden in the region and that their commitment to reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and 
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institution and peace-building has been a strong one. Continued attention and 
commitments of assistance from all donors remain crucial for medium- and long-term 
development in Kosovo. "85 
However, in the past two years President Bush's has expressed concerns over the 
longevity and commitment to KFOR stating that he hopes for a gradual decrease in U.S. 
force contributions to the area. In a letter to Congress dated January 31, 2003, President 
Bush stated that: 
The term "militarily significant" relates to tasks and objectives significant 
from a military standpoint that once accomplished, would allow for 
withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. In the establishment of the 
Kosovo benchmarks, four critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: 
military stability; public security; border/boundary issues; and war 
crimes/support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia.... I anticipate that Kosovo Force and U.S. participation in it 
will gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve and 
Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own self-
govemment. 86 
After the terrorist attack of 2001 on the United States, one can begin to see the evolution 
of U.S./NATO relations. This can be seen in President Bush's foreign policy decision 
after 9/11. Before the terrorist attacks, President Bush was willing to continue the 
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans as long as the operation was reevaluated every 
six months as set out by the KFOR initiative. President Bush's vision of U.S./NATO 
relations began to change after the terrorist attacks and this will be seen in greater detail 
in the chapters that follow. However, in the context of the mission in Kosovo, it was and 
continues to be evident that the United States was able to work within the alliance. It is 
also evident in the case of KFOR that, minus Operation Allied Force, the United States 
and its alliance partners have shared the burden. In order for NA TO to continue its 
position in the international community, this must continue. Since the attacks on the 
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United States, the alliance has come to the United States' aid and has taken on an even 
larger burden than they had prior to 9/11 in Kosovo. This is further evidence that the 
U.S./NATO relationship may be fragile, but not broken and has continued to persevere in 
the post-Cold War/post-9/11 environment. 
As of July 2004, U.S. troop's level in the Balkans is down to about 10 percent of 
the total KFOR force. By contrast, as will be seen in the chapters to follow, the United 
States provides about 75 percent of the manpower in Afghanistan and 90 percent in 
Iraq.87 Because the United States' NATO allies have agreed to take on a much larger 
burden in the Balkans the United States is able to shift its forces elsewhere. Since the 
beginning of the War on Terrorism, the United States has begun and continued to 
outsource its troops and supplies away from KFOR. At the same time the European 
NA TO allies have upped their own commitments to the peace in the Balkans, which now 
includes Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. 88 
CONCLUSION: 
Ultimately, U.S. allies shared the burden of the peacekeeping operation in 
Kosovo, but the United States was responsible for most of the allied strikes during 
Operation Allied Force. The major powers in Europe contributed troops that rivaled the 
United States' contributions. Since the KFOR mission began in 1999, the United States 
has decreased its level troop commitment. Furthermore, the United States has outsourced 
its resources to other parts of the world that the Bush Administration believes threaten the 
security of the United States. The Bush Administration, after great hesitation, has 
embraced both peacekeeping and multilateralism in the Kosovo reg10n. The 
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administration however has shown reluctance to subjecting U.S. freedom of operation to 
the latter. 
It is important to reiterate that at the outset of the KFOR peacekeeping mission 
the United States contributed more troops than any other NATO partner. The Clinton 
Administration, and subsequent Bush Administration, has made it clear that the European 
partners should carry much of the burden in Kosovo. This however was not the case at 
the outset of the mission and has only changed since the attacks on the United States. To 
lend further evidence to the U.S. leadership position in NATO, it was the United States 
that took the lead in stopping the humanitarian catastrophe that was taking place on the 
European continent and was putting the peace and stability of the region in jeopardy. 
Future history lessons will likely show that KFOR was successful in completing 
its aforementioned goals, and the logistical setup of KFOR had a lot to do with this. The 
multinational brigades that have been setup throughout the country show the 
interoperability of the alliance. The success can be shown through the progress that has 
occurred since KFOR's inception in 1999. In accordance with the Military Technical 
Agreement (MTA), Yugoslav and Serbian forces have withdrawn from Kosovo and the 
five-kilometer buffer zone. KFOR is also responsible for the training and 
implementation of the Kosovo Protection Corps, which in time will be accountable to 
Kosovo's democratically elected leadership. 
Most of the evidence that was presented in this chapter shows that the United 
States was instrumental in the organization and logistical aspects of KFOR. The Clinton 
Administration, especially Clinton's Secretary of State Madeline Albright, was very 
influential in establishing KFOR. Furthermore, the United States took command of the 
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Multinational Brigade whose mission was more dangerous than the other brigades. The 
evidence also shows that initially the United States played a key logistical role, not only 
in Operation Allied Force, but also in the setup of the Kosovo peacekeeping mission. 
What is disturbing about this is that the violence was taking place on the European 
continent, yet it took the United States to pressure its European NATO allies to intervene. 
Finally, the evidence in this case has shown that the United States has begun to distance 
itself from the alliance. During Bush's campaign he said that he wanted to reduce the 
level of troops in Kosovo, and he has fulfilled that promise. Part of this can be attributed 
to the United States redeploying troops to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, but since 9/11 the evidence shows that the United States is distancing itself 
from the KFOR. However, the KFOR mission continues to move forward with more 
European countries pledging troops to fill the void left by the United States. 
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CHAPTER III 
AFGHANISTAN 
ISAF 
Afghanistan is located in Southern Asia northwest of Pakistan and east of Iran. 
Afghanistan's recent history has been filled with war and civil unrest. In 1979 the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan, but was forced to leave by the anti-Communist Mujahidin 
forces that were trained and supplied by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, as 
well as many others. The Soviet-backed Communist government fought on until about 
1992, when an intense battle for control erupted between warring warlords. These 
various Mujahidin factions eventually produced the foreign sponsored Taliban 
government in 1996. The Taliban was able to capture most of the country and 
consolidate power. 89 
Following the September 111h attacks on the United States, a U.S.-led alliance 
toppled the Taliban. At a 2001 meeting in Bonn, Germany, leaders from the Afghan 
opposition groups met and agreed upon a plan to formulize a new democratically elected 
government. At this time the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was 
developed to help establish a working government that is representative of the 
population, as well as developing an Afghanistan that is able to develop a self-sustaining 
peaceful country that is able to provide its own security. 
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States, the Bush Administration 
made it clear that any country that harbored terrorists would be dealt with by force. In 
the aftermath of 9/11, NATO implemented Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This 
article states that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
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America shall be considered an attack against all of them." Immediately after the strikes 
of 9/11, NATO Secretary General George Robertson condemned the attacks: 
I condemn in the strongest possible terms the senseless attacks which have 
just been perpetrated against the United States of America .... These 
barbaric acts constitute intolerable aggression against democracy and 
underlie the need for the international community and the members of the 
alliance to unite their forces in fighting the scourge of terrorism.90 
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan allowed the Al Qaeda terrorist network, led by 
Osama Bin Laden, to operate within Afghanistan undeterred to train their militants and 
base their operations. In the weeks leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan, President 
George Bush issued a five point ultimatum to the Taliban government. First, the Taliban 
must deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in 
Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban must release all foreign nationals, including American 
citizens that have been unjustly imprisoned within Afghanistan. Third, the Taliban must 
protect all foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers that are working in Afghanistan. 
Fourth, the Taliban must close every terrorist training camp within Afghanistan and hand 
over terrorists, along with their support structure, to the appropriate international 
authorities. Finally, the Taliban must give the United States full access to terrorist 
training camps so it can be assured that they are no longer operational. 
THE BACKGROUND OF ISAF 
On Sunday, October 7, 2001, after the defiance of the Taliban regime to meet 
President Bush's ultimatum, Operation Enduring Freedom commenced with U.S. and 
British aerial bombings targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. 91 Operation Enduring 
Freedom was not a NATO mission. Sixteen countries, however, did contribute resources 
to the U.S.-led coalition. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield outlined six goals the 
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air campaign would accomplish. First, was to make clear to the Taliban that harboring 
terrorists carriers a heavy price. Second, was to acquire the necessary intelligence to 
facilitate any future operations that may be taken against the al-Qaeda terrorist network 
and the Taliban regime. Third, was to develop working relationships with forces within 
Afghanistan that opposed the Taliban government and al-Qaeda. Fourth, was to make it 
difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base for its operations. Fifth, was to alter 
the military balance by denying the Taliban government the necessary resources to stay 
in power and allowing opposition forces to catch up. Finally, was to provide the 
necessary humanitarian aid to the Afghani people who had suffered oppressive living 
conditions under the Taliban government.92 
American military officials wanted a clear chain of command that would be void of 
the problems that existed in the air war over Kosovo, when NATO interfered with the 
selection of targets. Furthermore, U.S. military officials did not want a significant 
amount of assistance from its alliance partners. Since the bulk of the campaign was 
dependent on air strikes, only a small number of ground troops were required to complete 
the mission. Therefore, only about 68,000 National Guard and Reserve forces were 
activated, or about a third of the number activated for the first Gulf War.93 This limited 
number of forces also enabled the United States to have a centralized command structure 
in which they would not be dependent upon consensus decision-making. Philip Gordon 
asserts that U.S. policy saw: 
European support as politically useful but not particularly significant 
militarily. In this case it was reinforced by what many Americans saw as 
a key "lesson" of Kosovo. Whereas many in Europe saw the Kosovo air 
campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and American 
generals, most Americans-particularly within the military-saw just the 
opposite: excessive European meddling, with French politicians and 
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European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, 
and compromising operational security. This time, the Bush team 
determined, would be different. 94 
It was clear from the beginning of the operation m Afghanistan that the Bush 
Administration wanted to steer clear of having to run everything past its European allies 
before they were able to act. 
After the military campaign had ended, it was clear to American leaders that a 
centralized command structure worked far better than the consensus-building structure 
that they had experienced during the air war over Kosovo. Although the European allies 
did not contribute greatly to Operation Enduring Freedom, the invocation of Article 5 did 
lead to a variety of assistance that helped make possible the success of the mission. In 
late September and early October, the Bush Administration made eight specific requests 
of the alliance. None of the requests, however, required any substantial deployments of 
NATO forces. 95 The fulfillment of these requests acted as a mechanism for the United 
States to use NATO as a way to coordinate measures amongst the allies and members of 
non-NATO coalition forces. Furthermore, these requests cleared the way for the United 
States to redeploy its troops from other ongoing NATO operations to the Afghan theatre. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted that the actions of the alliance demonstrate the 
future viability of the alliance: 
I think these actions show the viability of the alliance, shows that the 
alliance is growing; the alliance has a role to play. More and more nations 
want to become a part of the great alliance which has done such a brilliant 
job of preserving the peace and which is finding new missions for the 
future that will make it as vital as it has been in the past.96 
The contributions of the alliance, such as intelligence sharing and increasing their troop 
levels in the Balkans to replace American troops, increased the capabilities of the 
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coalition forces in Afghanistan and also freed up American resources that were involved 
in NATO missions elsewhere. Furthermore, for the first time in its history, NATO 
invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Even the invocation of Article 5 was 
different in the original scope of the alliance because it was invoked not to defend 
Europe, as was the original purpose, but to support a U.S.-led war outside the traditional 
boundaries of the European continent. 
However, it was evident during Operation Enduring Freedom that the United 
States did not want military operations to be tied up in the alliance by being dependent 
upon building a consensus to complete the mission. Instead, the United States picked and 
chose resources amongst the allies that they believed would be the most beneficial to 
them. This was made possible by the type of missions that were set forth during 
Operation Enduring Freedom in which the United States was dependent on anti-Taliban 
forces more so than its NA TO partners. 97 
In sum, Operation Enduring Freedom was comprised almost exclusively of U.S. 
troops and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance who have been battling the Taliban since 
its takeover in the mid- l 990s. The United States' NATO allies contributed by increasing 
their intelligence sharing, increasing their troop levels in the Balkans, and taking over the 
United States AW ACS mission in Kosovo. Although the military campaign in 
Afghanistan did not require any significant resources from the United States' European 
allies, the alliance's actions did help facilitate the success of the campaign. Lansford 
asserts that the alliance helped the United States in a number of ways including the 
invocation of Article 5 and strong diplomatic support for the Bush Administration at the 
outset of the war in Afghanistan. The alliance allowed for better cooperation between the 
56 
United States and the European Union, and NATO helped provide a forum in which 
U.S./Russian relations could be built upon. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented here that is 
important to the future of the alliance. However, addressing two of the most evident 
conclusions is sufficient to understand U.S./NATO relations. First, the United States did 
not want to work within the confines of NATO's military structure. Instead the United 
States picked the resources that they needed in order to complete the mission of 
overthrowing the Taliban regime. Second, the United States wanted to ensure that the 
mission in Afghanistan would be autonomous from NATO's consensus decision-making 
process. By keeping Operation Enduring Freedom a U.S.-led coalition mission, instead 
of a NATO mission, the United States avoided the problems that they encountered in 
Kosovo when some alliance members disagreed with target selection. 
THE CREATION OF ISAF 
After the major military operations in Afghanistan, that consisted U.S. forces, a 
coalition of 16 NATO members and non-NATO members, and Afghan anti-Taliban 
guerillas (the Northern Alliance), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was 
developed. The International Security Assistance Force was established in December 
2001 at the Bonn Conference under the authorization of the United Nations Security 
Council, and was tasked with securing Kabul from Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements and to 
help ensure the peaceful transition to the newly formed Afghan Transitional 
Administration. The agreements at the Bonn Conference helped to create a partnership 
between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan and ISAF.98 ISAF in not a U.N. peacekeeping force, instead it is made up of 
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a coalition of the willing that are deployed under the authority of U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510. These U.S. resolutions set the parameters of the 
international assistance force that NATO eventually took over from the United Nations. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 authorizes: 
as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 
months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan 
Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its 
surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the 
personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.99 
Security Council Resolution 1413 authorizes: 
The Member States participating in the International Security assistance 
Force to take all necessary measures to fulfill the mandate of the 
International Security Assistance Force; and calls upon Member States to 
contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the International 
Security Assistance Force, and to make contributions to the Trust Fund 
established pursuant to resolution 1386.100 
U. N. Security Council Resolutions 1444 and 1510 reaffirms the U.N.'s support for 
Resolutions 1389 and 1413. Originally, individual nations volunteered to lead the ISAF 
mission and turned over authority after a six-month rotation. ISAF was originally made 
up by a coalition that was deployed under the authority of the U.N. Security Council. 
However, ISAF saw its share of problems in which it became more and more difficult to 
find a country that was willing to take over command of the mission. Furthermore, it 
became increasingly difficult to set up a new command headquarters every six months 
when a change of command took place. From December 2001 until August 2003, ISAF 
was under the authority of the United Nations (led by the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Turkey and the Netherlands). 
Before NATO took over operationally of ISAF it became increasingly difficult to 
set up a new command headquarters every six months when a change of command took 
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place. The United Nations handed over command and control because it became more 
and more difficult to fill command slots and troop contributions to the mission. The 
United Nations believed that if NATO took over the ISAF mission that it would alleviate 
this problem. 101 However, it will be shown later that NATO incurred the same problems 
of countries fulfilling their pledges for troop contributions. 
In August 2003, NATO took over command and control of ISAF and by taking 
over this peacekeeping mission, NA TO initially helped overcome this problem. By 
taking over, NATO also allowed smaller countries that did not have the resources to take 
over command as the lead nation to be able to contribute to the alliance and the mission 
in Afghanistan which enabled them to play a strong role within ISAF. On August 11, 
2003, ISAF came under NATO command with Canada as the lead nation. 102 
ISAF, through NATO leadership, was established to help develop the conditions 
in Afghanistan in which it can enjoy a representative government and a self-sustaining 
peace. 103 ISAF's role in Afghanistan is to assist the newly formed transitional 
government, as well the international community, in maintaining the peace and security 
in the area of responsibility. ISAF also supports the Afghan Transitional Authority in 
expanding its authority across the country and in providing a safe environment in which 
free and fair elections can take place, spreading of the rule of law as well as helping in 
the reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, ISAF has helped to train the newly 
formed Afghan police force in Kabul as well as helping to rebuild the infrastructure 
including the rehabilitation of schools and hospital, restoring the countries' water supply 
as well as many other civil-military projects. 
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ISAF is structured into four components. First, ISAF Headquarters provides 
direction and planning for the Kabul Multinational Brigade as well as conducting 
operations to ensure the security within the area of responsibility. ISAF Headquarters is 
also tasked with acting as a liaison between the Afghan Transitional Government and the 
governmental and non-governmental organizations providing assistance to the country. 
Second, the Kabul Multination Brigade is ISAF's technical headquarters which is 
responsible for the daily planning and patrolling the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
operations. Third, the Kabul Afghan International Airport assists in the operation of the 
airport. Finally, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) help develop a secure 
environment for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 104 
ISAF is under the direct command on the North Atlantic Council, which provides 
the political direction and coordination for the mission in Afghanistan. Based on this 
guidance, command and control of the ISAF mission is exercised by NATO's military 
headquarters, namely the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) led 
by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Joint Force Commander 
(JFC) is responsible for the manning, training, deploying and sustaining of ISAF. 
Currently ISAF conducts patrols throughout Afghanistan's eighteen police districts to 
ensure a safe environment to the local population. It also coordinates CIMIC projects 
throughout its PRTs and works closely with the government of Afghanistan to support 
stabilization, reconstruction and nation-building activities. Politically, ISAF works with 
the Afghan government, the United Nations and the U.S.-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom in support of Afghanistan's security reform efforts. The ISAF mission and the 
ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom are two separate missions. While ISAF provides 
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security and peace for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom 
continues to be involved in combat operations hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda 
operatives. The PRTs are civil-military partnerships that demonstrate the commitment of 
the international community to the peace and security of Afghanistan. The civilian and 
military sectors are separate and only the military element is under the ISAF chain of 
command. The purpose of the PRTs is to help the transitional government extend its 
authority, to develop a secure environment and establish relations with local authorities, 
and to support activities that facilitate the reconstruction effort. 105 
What is notable about ISAF is the lack of U.S. leadership within the mission. 
Initially, the United States made it clear that the mandate for NATO's peacekeepers 
would be separate from that of U.S. troops in search of Al-Qaeda fighters and Osama bin 
Laden. 106 While contributing countries to ISAF perform no military operations, the 
United States and the Northern Alliance continue to search for Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
forces. ISAF forces on the other hand conduct no military patrols; instead they are there 
exclusively to ensure that the peace and security of the region is not threatened. 
By looking at a breakdown of ISAF troop contributions by allied nations a clearer 
look at the United States' reluctance to participate comes to light. For instance, ISAF 
began with around 6,500 troops from the twenty-six NA TO members as well as nine 
partner nations and two non-NATO/non-Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
nations. 107 NATO's non-American member countries constitute about 95 percent of the 
6,500 troops. Germany has the largest deployment in the region with approximately 
2,300 (about 35 percent) troops, while Canada is second with about 1,800 (about 28 
percent) troops. By comparison, the United States contributes only 67 Gust a little over 1 
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percent) support personnel to the ISAF mission. This is in sharp contrast to the KFOR 
mission in Kosovo where the Unites States supplied the most troops and was also a lead 
nation in one of the brigade sectors. 108 
Despite the invocation of Article 5, the transatlantic alliance was divided over the 
operations in Afghanistan. This fragmentation began in Kosovo when European leaders, 
most notably French and German, believed that the air war and subsequent peacekeeping 
operations were largely U.S. operations. The French on the other hand were displeased 
with their overall contributions to the mission in Afghanistan, and wanted to have a 
greater role in the military operations being conducted by the United States. The French 
were concerned that if they were delegated to the sidelines and relegated to cleaning up 
after the United States completed its military mission they would lose their rank-and-file 
position within the alliance. The French government took, what they called, a "balancer" 
position to ensure that the United States did not overstep their boundaries and expand 
military operations unnecessarily. 109 
Although the United States has only contributed some 67 personnel to the NATO-
led ISAF mission, it is not fair to underscore the contributions that the United States has 
made to the overall mission in Afghanistan of peace and security. Not only did the 
United States and British-led coalition defeat the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda 
networks that were working out of Afghanistan, but they continued to pursue these two 
groups after the peacekeeping mission had begun. There were about 13,000 American 
troops, which were tasked with hunting down Al Qaeda terrorists and remnants of the 
Taliban regime. This American-led force of 13,000 troops operates separately from the 
NATO-led ISAF mission. 
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In December 2002, the Defense Department announced the concept of the PR Ts 
to provide a safe haven for international aid workers that were helping with the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The United States was important to the development of 
ISAF and the expansion of the PRTs. The evidence shows that at the outset of the 
NATO-led ISAF mission, the Bush Administration was attempting to strengthen the 
ISAF mission by focusing on the concept of these PRTs to help foster the conditions 
necessary for the reconstruction effort. At the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom it is 
evident that the United States wanted to avoid the consensus-building decision making 
process that NATO requires. Therefore, the Bush Administration limited the amount of 
contributions that the alliance provided for this mission. They instead built a coalition of 
the willing, which allowed the United States to bypass NATO's integrated military 
command structure. When it was time to implement a peacekeeping operation in 
Afghanistan, the United States pressed for NATO to take its lead. The United States 
continues its pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Afghan countryside. 
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which help to develop a secure 
environment throughout Afghanistan, were originally restricted to the area within and 
around Kabul. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1510 changed this and now 
nineteen PRTs operate throughout Afghanistan. Resolution 1510 authorizes: 
The expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance 
Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional 
Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of 
Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan 
Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other 
international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction 
and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to 
provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of 
the Bonn Agreement. Calls upon the International Security Assistance 
Force to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan 
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Transitional Authority and its successors and the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom 
Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate. 110 
Currently, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand (a non-NATO member) 
and Germany are in command of the PR Ts while other coalition partners contribute team 
members.11 1 Through these PRTs, the United States' has helped the Afghan people carry 
out their own civil-military operations as well as their own security functions. The 
United States has trained over 15,000 troops that are a part of the Afghan National Army. 
Members of the Afghan National Army are deployed by the Afghan transitional 
government to sixteen provinces. The United States has also trained over 25,000 police 
officers at the five regional training centers throughout Afghanistan. 112 ISAF also 
assisted the Afghan government in providing a secure environment in which the country 
could hold its first elections that were free and fair. 
Although the United States has contributed little to the organizational, military 
and logistical aspects of ISAF, the U.S. has made life much easier for its Atlantic 
partners. The United States, through the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom, has been 
able to reduce the possibility that the Taliban regime could resurface in Afghanistan. 
Since Afghanistan is still relatively unstable and ISAF is working to stabilize it, the 
United States has contributed greatly to the NA TO mission. It is important to note here 
that NATO was able to successfully implement a peacekeeping mission without the large 
troop contributions of the United States. However, ISAF has come under great scrutiny 
because NA TO has found it difficult to maintain an adequate level of troop commitments. 
Since NATO decided to expand its area of responsibility outside the city of Kabul, many 
nations have reneged on sending more troops while others have proposed sending civilian 
64 
contractors in to fulfill their commitments to ISAF. Paul Rice, spokesman for the ISAF 
mission said in a December 2003 statement that "you can't plan until you know who will 
give what ... we're going to piece together whatever we can get our hands on."113 Rice 
also pointed out that the number of troops from non-US alliance members equals 
approximately 1.5 million and can deploy some 7,000 helicopters. However, the alliance 
has had trouble maintaining a troop level of about 6,700 and as of December 2003, 
NATO had only three helicopters deployed in the area. 114 The NATO-led ISAF mission 
depends largely on the United States to provide air support, medical evacuations and 
resupply. 115 
Despite the fact that the United States has contributed very little to the ISAF 
mission, it is still evident that the United States continues to have a leadership position 
within the alliance. This is evident by the evolution of the mission that will be discussed 
in the next section. While some may argue, most notably Lansford, that Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the subsequent ISAF peacekeeping missions shows the viability 
of the alliance, others have noted that this is the beginning of the end for the transatlantic 
alliance. By looking at ISAF's structure, it is evident that the United States continues to 
hold a leadership position within the alliance. Although the U.S. does not contribute 
much directly to the ISAF mission, they are still in command of many of the PR Ts that 
have now ventured out across the country. Also, the United States continues to provide 
close air support, medical evacuations and resupply of troops when needed. The 
structure of ISAF, most importantly the development and expansion of the PRTs, was 
developed by the United States before NATO took over the mission from the United 
Nations. Therefore, it is evident that the United States has been instrumental in 
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development and expansion of the mission, even if ISAF lacks U.S. contributions. One 
important conclusion comes to light here, and that is the fact that the United States has 
begun to retreat from the alliance. Instead the United States is taking a much more 
autonomous, or unilateral, approach to foreign policy in regards to the alliance. The 
evidence of the creation of ISAF suggests that the United States prefers not to have its 
hands tied by alliance members. While NATO is the core ofISAF, the evidence suggests 
that without the United States and Afghanistan transitional government asking NATO to 
take on a larger role in the security of Afghanistan, NA TO may not have implemented 
such a mission. 
THE EVOLUTION OF ISAF 
At the outset of the NATO-led ISAF mission, President Bush maintained that the 
United States would not participate in any peacekeeping operations within Afghanistan. 
Instead, the approximately 13,000 combat troops deployed within Afghanistan would 
continue to hunt down remnants of the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
More recently however, the United States troops deployed in the area of responsibility 
have assisted ISAF in a number of ways including logistical, intelligence and quick 
reaction force support, but the U.S. troops still do not participate in any peacekeeping 
operations. 
The ISAF peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan has evolved from about 4,500 
troops in 2003 when NATO took over the mission, to about 9,000 as recently as the first 
presidential elections that took place on October 9, 2004. 116 The mission has also 
expanded beyond the original area of responsibility of Kabul. When the United Nations 
proposed that ISAF expand outside of the region of Kabul, Washington opposed it 
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fearing that the peacekeeping operations would interfere with the United States' military 
campaign to eliminate Al-Qaeda and the former Taliban regime. While the United States 
opposed this expansion, many European leaders expressed a willingness to commit more 
troops to ISAF. However, once it was decided that ISAF would be expanded, these same 
European countries have lost their desire to commit these additional troops. 117 
In early February 2003, the U.S. Secretary of Defense called on NATO to take on 
a larger role in Afghanistan by expanding the number of PR Ts to help develop a safer 
environment for the reconstruction of the country. 118 At about the same time, Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai said that the expansion of ISAF is vital for the improving 
reconstruction and security of the country. 119 By June 2004, there were ten U.S.-led PR Ts 
in operation throughout the country. Since this time, the United States' NATO allies 
have taken over most of these PR Ts, while the United States continues to run the PR Ts in 
southern and eastern Afghanistan emphasizing counter-insurgency and anti-al Qaeda 
missions instead of focusing on the rebuilding of Afghanistan's infrastructure like the 
other PRTs. 
Recently, the United States has begun to press its alliance partners into combining 
the peacekeeping efforts with the U.S.-led combat operations. Nicholas Burns, U.S. 
ambassador to NATO stated, "Most countries that spoke today, including our country, 
said the goal should be one NATO mission," rather than the two separate missions that 
have been ongoing since ISAF was deployed to Afghanistan. 120 However, France and 
Germany has opposed any merger between the U.S. and NATO forces. The German and 
French governments have criticized this move as a way in which the United States could 
reduce its troop levels in Afghanistan to redeploy them to Iraq. Whether this is a fracture 
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within the alliance is yet to be seen, but it is evident that the rift over Iraq has certainly 
spilled over within the alliance, affecting other NA TO missions such as ISAF. German 
Defense Minister Peter Stuck has said that Germany would be opposed to any union 
between ISAF's peacekeeping mission and the U.S. combat operations. Stuck said that: 
"There is a clear "no" of the German government for a merging of the 
mandates ... We'll continue focusing on reconstruction while other nations 
are engaged in the fight against international terrorism."121 
Unlike the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, the United States has not contributed 
much to the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. In fact, as of October 2004, the 
United States has contributed just the 67 command and support personnel to ISAF while 
its NATO partners scramble to fill the troop commitment levels that are needed to ensure 
that the mission is successful. The evidence suggests that the lack of U.S. contributions 
to the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is a possible retreat from the alliance. This 
anomaly can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, the United States saw in both 
Bosnia and Kosovo that the military and operational gap within the alliance was larger 
:han expected and NATO lacked the necessary interoperability to fulfill the objectives of 
:he mission. Second, the United States did not have the Europeans interfering, through 
he alliance's centralized command structure, with the logistical planning and 
mplementation of Operation Enduring Freedom. Instead, the United States worked 
vithin the military framework of United States military leaders. The coalition that the 
Jnited States formed was a broad-based coalition of the willing including both member 
.nd non-member NATO countries. Furthermore, at the outset of Operation Enduring 
1reedom, NA TO was leadership was not involved in the planning or implementation of 
1e operation. Finally and maybe most importantly, is how ISAF has evolved since the 
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invasion of Iraq. Since there was a division within the alliance of whether or not to go to 
war with Iraq, it made the United States' decision to basically conduct Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the continuous search for Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants alone 
easier. Because some alliance members interfered with the logistics of the air war during 
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, it made more sense to the United States to carry out 
Operation Enduring Freedom without outsourcing command to the alliance. It was much 
easier for the United States to work within a coalition that wanted to contribute to the war 
on terror, not from states that felt they had to because of their membership in NATO. 
In sum, the United States has moved away from the alliance in terms of 
contributing troops to NATO peacekeeping missions. In August 2003, President Bush 
reiterated this by stating that the U.S. presence is being "gradually replaced" by troops 
from NATO allies. He reiterated this by stating: 
"We've got about 10,000 troops there, which is down from, obviously, 
major combat operations," he said. "And they're there to provide security 
and they're there to provide reconstruction help. But both those functions 
are being gradually replaced by other troops. Germany, for example, is 
now providing the troops for ISAF [International Security Assistance 
Force], which is the security force for Afghanistan, under NATO control. 
In other words, more and more coalition forces and friends are beginning 
to carry a lot of the burden in Afghanistan." 122 
Notice that President Bush referred to these troops as providing the security and 
reconstruction help for the Afghan government. He also states that these functions are 
being "replaced" by other troops, which is likely a reference to the newly developing 
PR Ts that have recently been expanded outside of Kabul. It is also important to point out 
that "more and more coalition forces" are taking on a bigger role in Afghanistan. 
However, as mentioned before, NATO allies are reluctant to come to a consensus on the 
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fusion of the ISAF mission under NATO command and Operation Enduring Freedom 
under U.S. command. 
In a November 10, 2004 meeting with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer, President Bush repeated the United States' "commitment to a strong and vibrant 
NAT0." 123 At this same meeting Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer stressed to 
President Bush "that NA TO is the most effective way for Allies to meet their 21st 
century requirements, more so than going it alone or coalitions of the willing. In 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, and through training assistance to Iraq, the Alliance is delivering 
on its commitments." 124 
CONCLUSION: 
The development, and subsequent evolution, of ISAF is not only important to the 
future of Afghanistan, but also to NATO's future. This is the first mission that NATO 
has undertaken outside the traditional boundaries of Europe, and it is important to its 
future viability and vibrancy that all member countries work together to ensure its 
success. The U.S.-led war with Iraq placed quite a bit of stress upon the alliance. During 
the past year, the United States and its European partners have been struggling with this 
division. 
However, it is important to point out the dissent within the alliance that occurred 
when forces were pulled out of the Afghan region and redeployed in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Most notably was the dissent by Germany and France, two of the larger 
European powers. In a strange tum of events in early October 2004, the United States 
began to ask NATO to take on a larger role in Afghanistan by fusing together the ISAF 
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mission with U.S. combat operations. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Bums told 
reporters on October 12, 2004 that the aim of the United States is to combine the two 
missions under one NA TO command. Germany and France adamantly oppose any 
combination of the two missions, believing it to be counterproductive and makes no sense 
because combining combat operations with peacekeeping is logistically difficult to 
achieve with any efficiency. However, both countries have left open the door for larger 
troop contributions as well as supporting the expansion of the ISAF force throughout the 
country. 125 NATO has now increased the number of troops in Afghanistan to about 9,000 
in anticipation of the first democratically held elections in the new independent 
Afghanistan. 126 The successful elections that took place under the watchful eye of NATO 
and the United Nations can only further the future viability of the alliance. If the 
elections in Afghanistan are successful, the legitimacy of NATO as an alliance that is 
able to spread democratic values will inevitably improve. That is if the alliance can 
recover from the fracture that developed in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq and 
subsequent requests by the United States for NATO to take on an active role in Iraq's 
rebuilding process. 
Three lessons emerge from the evidence in this chapter. First, NATO leadership 
found it difficult to maintain an adequate troop level to support ISAF. NATO took over 
the ISF mission from the United Nations because the U.N. could not get countries to 
volunteer resources and troops to the ISAF mission. Until more recently, NATO 
inevitably ran into the same problem. Second, the United States originally did not want 
to give up command of Operation Enduring Freedom. Instead, the United States kept 
operational autonomy, most likely because of lessons learned in Kosovo, of combat 
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operations dealing with the hunting down of al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants. The United 
Kingdom was the only country that the United States felt a desire to cooperate with 
during these missions. Finally, European partners believed that the United States only 
asked to fuse the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions together because they 
wanted the flexibility of redeploying troops to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 127 However, the United States has rebuffed this claim and has attempted to 
assure alliance members that the increase in ISAF troop levels is solely for the purpose of 
protecting the legitimacy of the November 2004 elections. The alliance has maintained 
that Afghanistan is now NATO's number one priority and argue that the alliance has no 
place in Iraq until the mission in Afghanistan is complete. 128 
Unfortunately the split that occurred over the United States' decision to overthrow 
the Hussein regime in Iraq has had a spill over effect into other NA TO missions, 
including ISAF and the Training Implementation Mission just underway in Iraq. Unless 
the United States, Germany, Belgium and France can get over this rift, the future of the 
alliance is in question. This rift has slowed the decision making process within NATO to 
almost a halt. Finally, many scholars argued that the expansion of NATO would slow 
down the decision-making process and make unanimity nearly impossible. Not many 
believed that it would be some of the alliance's oldest and most powerful members that 
would make this anomaly come true. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IRAQ 
TRAINING IMPLEMENTATION MISSION 
(NTIM-I) 
Following the 1991 Gulf War, in which a U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraq from 
Kuwait, the United Nations placed sanctions on the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. 
For twelve years Saddam Hussein ignored and violated United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. On March 19 2003, a U.S.-led invasion took place to oust the Iraqi president. 
This invasion, known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, was a dark point in the history of the 
transatlantic alliance. Under great scrutiny from some of the larger members, namely 
Belgium, France and Germany, the United States and Great Britain were the lead nations 
during the war with Iraq. Soon after the U.S.-led coalition toppled the Hussein regime in 
Iraq, it was up to the international community to develop a plan to stabilize the region. 
Despite the dissent within the alliance, NATO once again came to the aid of the United 
States by developing the training implementation mission. 
THE BACKGROUND OF NTIM-1 
During the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom there was quite a bit of dissent 
within the alliance, particularly from France and Germany. German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroder did not agree with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq for a couple of reasons. First, 
the United Nations weapons inspectors had not found a "smoking gun" in Iraq that would 
lead him to believe that Saddam Hussein was in possession of WMDs. Second, 
Chancellor Schroder faced a populace that was adamantly against the war and since he 
was up for reelection, he thought it was in his best interest to criticize the United States, 
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especially President Bush, for not allowing the U.N. adequate time to conduct its 
investigation. 129 France, however, was in a different position altogether in their criticism 
of an attack against Iraq. First, France is a permanent member of the U.N. Security 
Council and President Jacques Chirac believed that it was his duty to uphold what he 
believed to be the international law of war in the decision to attack a sovereign state. 
Furthermore, President Chirac believed that the Bush Administration's policy of 
preemptive war was wrong and could inevitably lead to the collapse of the international 
order. President Chirac, like many European leaders, also faced staunch resistance by the 
French populace on the decision to go to war. 130 Unlike President Chirac and Chancellor 
Schroder, most European leaders had given up hope that the only global superpower 
would voluntarily restrain from attacking Iraq. 
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, the United States requested from 
Turkey that the United States base operations out of southeastern Turkey so that the 
northern front of Iraq would be covered. The newly elected Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) in Turkey were thought to be pro-American. The United States also 
believed that the AKP was becoming one of the U.S.'s most reliable allies because of 
their willingness to take over command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2002. 
However, this was not the case and the AKP believed it to be politically impossible to 
allow U.S. troops to base operations out of Turkey in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
on a domestic level. In the end, Turkey's governments request to its parliament to allow 
U.S. troops to base operations out of Turkey fell short of the majority vote required and 
was therefore defeated. 131 
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Although the war in Iraq was supported by some NATO members and those 
members did send forces to aid in the U.S.-led war, there was no consensus on whether or 
not to go to war with Iraq. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 
of the Washington Treaty to come to the United States' defense after the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11. However, alliance members such as France and Germany were vocal against the 
alliance's adoption of a "blank check" resolution that would enable President Bush to 
utilize NATO resources as he pleased in the war on terrorism. French and German 
leaders wanted to make sure that any operation that would involve NATO resources be 
discussed before it was implemented. 132 Furthermore, Germany and France wanted the 
United States to hold off on any military operations against Iraq in hopes that a 
diplomatic compromise could be made. However, President Bush disagreed with the 
advice given by two of the larger NATO allies. In a speech given March 17, 2003 to the 
American people President Bush stated: 
"The world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy ... In the case of Iraq, the 
Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 
687 -- both still in effect -- the United States and our allies are authorized 
to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. For more than 
a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and 
honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war." 133 
On January 15, 2003, the United States formally requested from the alliance a 
plan that would lend various kinds of support in the event that military action occurred 
against Iraq. Included in this request was the protection by NATO forces of U.S. bases in 
Europe, the replacement of U.S. troops redeployed from the Balkan to Iraq and the 
protection of Turkey from any attack from Iraq. Included in the request was the use of 
AW ACS surveillance planes, chemical-biological response units and deploying Patriot 
anti-missile batteries in Turkey. 134 After three weeks of Belgium, France and Germany 
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blocking any accord that would allow NA TO to begin drawing up plans to determine 
what contributions the alliance would provide in case of military action against Iraq, 
NATO Secretary General George Robertson decided to act. On Thursday, February 6, 
2003, Secretary General George Robinson invoked the "silence procedure" in hopes of 
coming to a consensus on the defense of Turkey should there be a spill-over effect from 
Iraq. Under the "silence procedure," the Secretary General writes to each member's 
delegation and if there are no objections raised, NATO would begin military planning 
automatically. 135 Germany, France and Belgium believed that the timing of the issue was 
bad because they believed that there were still diplomatic routes to take in dealing with 
Iraq. On Monday, February 10, 2003, France, Germany and Belgium broke that silence 
procedure which blocked NATO planning for the protection of Turkey from any military 
threat from Iraq in case war breaks out. 136 In response to these three countries blocking 
the initiative to begin military planning to protect Turkey, the Turkish government 
requested consultations within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as 
expressed in its letter of 10 February 2003, and pursuant to Article 4 of the Washington 
Treaty which states: 
"The Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties 
is threatened. "137 
Despite objections by France, on February 19, 2003, NATO's Defense Planning 
Committee (which excluded France) authorized the military authorities to implement 
defensive measures to assist Turkey. 138 NATO implemented Operation Display 
Deterrence which lasted from February to April 2003. This mission was conducted to 
contribute to the defense of Turkey at the outset of the U.S. invasion of Iraq to ensure 
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that a spillover effect did not occur. 139 Operation Display Deterrence provided Turkey 
with A WACS surveillance aircraft, Patriot missile systems and chemical-biological 
response units. Despite the lack of support from two of its major NATO allies, the 
United States went ahead with the invasion of Iraq with a coalition of NATO members 
and non-NATO members. 
On March 19, 2003, the United States and Great Britain commenced an attack 
against the Hussein-led Iraqi regime. The attack against Saddam Hussein had eight 
:.lbjectives that the U.S.-led coalition hoped to achieve. First, was to end the reign of the 
Saddam Hussein led regime. Second, was to identify, isolate and dispose of Iraq's 
~eapons of mass destruction (WMDs ). Third, was to search, root out and capture any 
:errorist outlets out of the country. Fourth, was to collect intelligence related to terrorist 
1etworks throughout the Middle East. Fifth, was to collect intelligence on the transfer of 
N"MDs throughout the world. Sixth was to end U.N. sanctions and provide humanitarian 
·esources to the Iraqi citizens. Seventh, was to secure and return Iraq's oil fields to the 
raqi people. Finally, is to help secure an environment in which the Iraqi people can 
. . 140 
mJoy a representative government. 
Although the war in Iraq was supported by some NATO members and those 
nembers did send forces to aid in the U.S.-led war, there was no consensus on whether or 
tot to go to war with Iraq. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 
if the Washington Treaty to come to the United States' defense after the terrorist attacks 
1f 9/11. However, alliance members such as France and Germany were vocal against the 
lliance's adoption of a "blank check" resolution that would enable President Bush to 
ltilize NATO resources as he pleased in the war on terrorism. French and German 
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leaders wanted to make sure that any operation that would involve NATO resources be 
discussed before it was implemented. 141 Furthermore, Germany and France wanted the 
United States to hold off on any military operations against Iraq in hopes that a 
diplomatic compromise could be made. However, President Bush disagreed with the 
advice given by two of the larger NATO allies. In a speech given March 17, 2003 to the 
American people President Bush stated: 
"The world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy .. .In the case oflraq, the 
Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 
687 -- both still in effect -- the United States and our allies are authorized 
to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. For more than 
a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and 
honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war."142 
Despite the lack of support from two of its major NATO allies, the United States went 
ahead with the invasion of Iraq with a coalition of NATO members and non-NATO 
members. 
In April of 2003, the United States also asked for NATO countries to contribute to 
a stabilization force that would help in keeping peace in Iraq. Again, despite objections 
from France and Germany, Poland stepped forward and the North Atlantic Council 
helped the Polish government in the planning and implementation of this stabilization 
force. On September 3, 2003, Poland assumed command of the Multinational Division 
(MND) Central South in Iraq as part of the international stabilization force. NATO has 
assisted Poland in a number of ways including providing intelligence, logistics expertise, 
movement co-ordination, force generation and secure communications support. 143 In 
what seems like a renewed vigor in supporting the United States campaign in the war on 
terror, several NATO countries contributed to the Polish-led stabilization force including 
Spain who provided the Deputy Commander, while other allied contributors include 
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Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, 
Slovakia and the United States. Ukraine, a non-NATO member, was the second largest 
contributor. After the implementation of this force, Secretary General George Robinson 
reiterated NATO's resolve by stating: 
"Together with other NATO operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, 
the Alliance's support for Poland in Iraq demonstrates the important 
contribution NATO is making to stability and crisis management and the 
fight against terrorism." 144 
The evidence here shows that a ma3or divide occurred between some alliance 
members and others. The rift that occurred during the United States' decision to attack 
Iraq also spilled over into other issues that pressed NATO. First, the countries that 
objected to the war m Iraq argued that all diplomatic measures had not yet been 
attempted and NATO never endorsed the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Furthermore, they believed that the United States had not found the "smoking gun" that 
Saddam supposedly had WMDs. However, this split included three of the larger and 
more important members, while many allies contributed troops or support personnel to 
the U.S.-led coalition. One important lesson that can be learned from the evidence found 
in the background of the NTIM-I is that the United States continues its leadership 
position in the post 9111 environment. Despite some dissent amongst the allies, a 
majority of the U.S. 's alliance partners took action and participated in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 145 The United States was also important in getting the alliance to agree on the 
defense of Turkey. Originally, Belgium, Germany and France opposed a measure that 
would require NATO to come to Turkey's aide if they were attacked, but the United 
States continued to push until the measure was passed through the Defense Planning 
Committee in which Germany and Belgium agreed to the mission. 146 Belgium and 
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Germany agreed to this measure only after they were assured that the allies continued "to 
support efforts in the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the crisis," and only 
due to the defensive nature of the request. 147 Some members of the alliance believed that 
France's defiance of Turkey's Article IV request to be the worst crises that the alliance 
has faced in its 55-year history. Turkish Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis said in February 
of 2003 that "if the response is not given, then the credibility of the military alliance will 
collapse. If this is not done, then the credibility and deterrence of the military alliance 
will come to zero."148 In addition to getting NATO members to commit to the defense of 
Turkey, the United States was also instrumental in getting member countries to pledge 
troops and resources to the Polish-led Iraqi Stabilization Force. 
THE CREATION OF NTIM-1 
The United States, as well as Great Britain, has pushed for the alliance to take on 
a greater role in postwar-Iraq. Others continued to disagree with any NATO forces in 
Iraq. German Defense Minister Peter Struck was especially opposed to a NATO 
commitment in Iraq saying that NATO has no place there. In December 2003, when U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell urged NATO to take on a greater role in Iraq, leaders 
from member countries argued that the more pressing issue of the time was Afghanistan. 
Outgoing Secretary General George Robertson stated in December: 
"We've not yet come to the stage of discussing whether a wider role is 
appropriate for NATO in Iraq ... we are giving support to Poland, they 
undoubtedly will come and report to us .... from that maybe there will be 
other applications for help for individual countries or in that division ... We 
have already become involved in Iraq ... There was nobody saying 'no' but 
at the moment our preoccupation is with Afghanistan." 
In early June 2004, President Bush asked for NA TO to take on a greater role in 
Iraq. At the time, sixteen NATO members had pledged troops to the U.S.-led coalition of 
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the willing that undertook Operation Iraqi Freedom. "We will work with our NATO 
friends to at least continue the role that now exists, and hopefully expand it somewhat," 
Bush said. French President Jacques Chirac did not believe that Iraq was NATO's place 
of business stating, "It does not fit within the vocation of NATO to intervene in Iraq." 149 
President Bush however never asked NATO to contribute any troops for combat, but 
insisted that the alliance provide resources and personnel to train new Iraqi security and 
defense forces. 
At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, French President Jacques Chirac disagreed 
with President Bush's vision of NATO's role in postwar-Iraq. At this summit, the 26 
members of NATO agreed to train Iraqi armed forces. President Bush called this a 
"triumph" and important to the future of the alliance, but Chirac tried to dilute Bush's 
victory by saying, "I would be entirely hostile to any presence of NATO in Iraq."150 The 
divisions that began with the United States' insistence that NATO should take on a 
greater role in Iraq were both military and political. The United States believed that the 
training mission should be integrated into the command structure of the U.S.-led 
coalition. France, however, disagreed and believed that the mission should fall only 
under the command of NATO leaders. The divisions that continued to hold-up the 
mission was centered around where the training would take place, who would pay for it 
and how closely it would be linked to the U.S.-led coalition. French President Jacques 
Chirac suggested that the training should take place outside of Iraq. Both the French and 
German governments made it clear that they would not send troops into Iraq but would 
agree to train Iraqi forces outside oflraq. 151 The United States, however, believes that for 
the sake of efficiency, the training mission should come under the command of the U.S.-
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led coalition. 152 In a political victory within the alliance for the United States, NATO 
overcame French resistance and agreed to send a delegation to Iraq to train Iraqi 
forces. 153 The core of the NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM-I) 
arrived in Iraq on August 14, 2004. 154 
The Iraqi Intern Government asked NATO for help in implementing a training 
mission that would help Iraq provide for its own security as well as bolstering new 
security institutions that have been created. 155 Much like the current NATO mission in 
Afghanistan, the NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM-I) is separate from the 
United States ongoing combat operations within Iraq. The NTIM-I is involved in the 
training, equipping and technical assistance of Iraqi senior security and defense officials. 
Since the NTIM-I went into effect, there have been about fifty NATO officers on the 
ground training Iraqi personnel, led by Dutch Major General Carel Hilderink. 156 Since its 
implementation, NATO has expanded its operations by establishing an Iraqi Training, 
Education and Doctrine Center where Iraqi officials will be trained by NATO officials. 
This center will focus on leadership training and building a multi-ethnic security 
institution in which all Iraqis will feel safer. 
The Training Implementation Mission is under the political control of NATO's 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and is in coordination with the U.S.-Multinational Force 
(MNF). Currently, U.S. Lieutenant General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S-led 
MNF is the commander of both the MNF and the NTIM-I. On issues concerning the 
NATO mission, General Petraeus reports up the chain of command to NATO' Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) U.S. General James L. Jones who answers 
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directly to the North Atlantic Council. Under the current structure, the U.S.-led MNF 
provides the security for NATO forces deployed to Iraq. 157 
The creation ofNTIM-I is seen by alliance members as a benchmark for NATO to 
undertake issues that are outside of the "classic" NATO sphere. 158 NATO officials also 
agree that maintaining the security of the European continent means facing new threats 
where they start, instead of waiting for them to come to Europe. Hence, NATO must go 
"out-of-area," before these new threats come to the doorsteps of the European countries. 
Politically, the alliance was also under pressure to do something in Iraq. U.S. Senators 
blasted European leaders for dragging their feet in a decision to help in Iraq. Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) said in June: 
"It's really time that they do step up. If we don't hand over the capacity 
for this sovereign government to be secure within its own borders and to 
be at peace with itself, then we're going to inherit a circumstance in Iraq 
that is equally as dangerous to us" as having ousted President Saddam 
Hussein. It's time for NATO, and particularly the French and Germans, to 
act more responsibly now."159 
Furthermore, the dissenting NATO members said that they wanted the Iraqi interim 
government to ask for help before they initiated any training mission. Iraqi interim Prime 
Minister Iyad Allawi asked for help in June of 2004, but these NATO members continue 
to drag their feet and object to sending troops in support of the training mission. 160 
The United States again shows not only their leadership position in NATO, but 
also that they are the hegemonic power in the world. Despite staunch rejections by 
France, Germany and Belgium, the United States was still able to get NATO to come to a 
consensus on a training mission in Iraq. This consensus was not, however, without its 
problems and the consensus decision itself has left something to be desired. Even though 
the United States had the ability to gain a consensus through the alliance, most of the 
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personnel that is involved in NTIM-I are from countries that had participated either in the 
coalition that joined the U.S. during Operation Iraqi Freedom or have troops already 
deployed there in support of the stabilization force. However, this may have come at a 
great price to the alliance. Time will tell if the alliance is able to survive these turbulent 
times. The evidence here suggests that this may not be the case. 
THE EVOLUTION OF NTIM-1 
Before the training mission was implemented, the rift between the United States 
and France continued to delay a decision for NATO to undertake such a mission. The 
United States wanted the NATO mission be linked to the U.S.-led coalition, but French 
officials feared the move would open the door to NATO involvement in battling the 
insurgency. 161 Since NATO decided to undertake the training mission in Iraq, Germany 
and France have continued to object to the training of Iraqi officers in Iraq. Instead they 
have insisted that, if they participate in the training mission, it should occur outside of 
Iraq. 162 Neither France nor Germany has contributed any training officials to the mission 
in Iraq. 
At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO agreed to begin training Iraqi officials 
sometime within the next couple of months. Originally, fifty-seven officials were sent to 
Iraq to begin the training mission. The United States had been pressuring the alliance to 
take on a greater burden in Iraq, but alliance member quelled at the notion and some 
made it clear that they would not support any mission that involved a NATO flag on the 
ground in Iraq. However, since the Istanbul Summit, alliance members have begun to 
come together and decide to implement such a mission. By October 2004, NATO's 
defense ministers agreed on a plan to speed up the deployment of 300 training officers to 
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Iraq by the end of the year to help train more Iraqi officials that will be able to safeguard 
the January 2005 elections. 163 A bulk of this first wave of instructors will come from the 
United States, Great Britain, Denmark, and Norway. However, in late October 2004, the 
rift between France and the United States resurfaced. U.S. officials believe that France, 
along with Belgium, Germany and Spain, are trying to obstruct NATO's attempt to gain a 
consensus on the future of Iraq. Dombey asserts that the split that occurred in 2003 has 
spilled over into other areas of NATO, which has made even relatively routine decisions 
require great debate and political capital. 164 
As of November 19, 2004, at least six alliance members have refused to send 
military instructors to train Iraqi officials in support of the Training Implementation 
Mission. Despite assurance that the NATO mission would not involve any combat 
duties, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece have refused to play 
an active role in contributing troops to the NTIM-I mission. These same countries earlier 
refused to contribute any troops to the U.S.-led coalition that overthrew Saddam Hussein. 
Despite this refusal, all twenty-six allied members voted for the training program and 
agreed to help fund it. Sixteen of the alliance members agreed to either contribute 
trainers, protection troops or both. The United States will absorb the brunt of the 
operation contributing most of the 400 officers as well as most of the 1,200 protection 
force. 165 
In sum, before, during and after the war in Iraq, NATO was divided amongst its 
members creating the worst crises that the alliance has seen in its 55-year history. The 
evolution of NTIM-I is yet another example of the United States contributions to the 
alliance, politically and militarily. Despite the dissent of Belgium, Germany and France 
85 
" 
- J 
the United States was able to get NATO to implement the mission to protect Turkey, the 
Polish-led stabilization force, and finally the NATO Training Implementation Mission in 
Iraq. The United States worked within the alliance to build a broad coalition of support 
for the mission in Iraq and eventually won approval. However, there is still animosity 
that exists between some NATO members, especially the United States and France, 
which could threaten the mission in Iraq. 
CONCLUSION: 
The United States attacked Iraq despite a growing dissent amongst it more 
powerful and influential allies within NATO, showing its resolve that it does not have to 
work with the alliance, especially if they wanted to avoid a central command structure 
that required consensus in order to act. The United States was able to build a coalition 
within a coalition of both members and non-members of NATO to support Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Despite the dissent of six allied members, the United States was still able 
to get the alliance to agree to undertake a role in post-war Iraq. Both Germany and 
France said that they would not support such a measure, but in the end the decision to 
establish the Training Implementation Mission was made by consensus. However, the 
six (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece) before mentioned allies 
have declined to participate in the mission. Both the United States and the Europeans had 
to make concessions in order to implement this mission, but none the less the alliance 
came together to take on such a mission. 
After the July 2004 Istanbul Summit in an article published in the United Press 
International, Andrea Riemer argued that the alliance must go "out-of-area" before the 
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new security threats comes to Europe. 166 The peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan and 
this training mission in Iraq are certainly steps in the right directions to keep NATO a 
viable working alliance. However, this mission more than any other has shown the 
leadership and resolve of the United States in their relationship to the transatlantic 
alliance. When the United States went to war without a resolution from the United 
Nations or without the complete support of NATO, it appeared that the alliance may have 
been broken. Furthermore, France and Germany were adamantly against any NATO role 
in postwar Iraq despite the fact that sixteen NATO members had joined the U.S.-led 
alliance to expel Saddam Hussein from Iraq. 
The Bush Administration did not want to use NATO's consensus-based military 
command structure during Operation Iraqi Freedom so that they would be free to conduct 
the operations as they pleased. However, after the operation was complete, the Bush 
Administration wanted NATO to take on a role in Iraq. This is much like the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan in such a way that the United States did not use NATO's military 
command structure but asked NATO to take on a post-war role in Afghanistan. Never in 
its 55 year history had the alliance faced such division, but in the end, the United States 
was instrumental in getting the alliance to accept the accords to protect Turkey, convince 
the alliance to logistically support the Polish-led stabilization force, and help lead the 
implementation of the training mission in Iraq, although at potentially a very heavy price. 
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James Jones, has said that 
he expects up to 3,000 troops to be deployed in support of the training mission in Iraq. 
This is a lofty goal considering NATO is having trouble getting member countries to 
commit just a fraction of this amount, and especially if four of the largest contributors to 
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NATO continue to say that they will not contribute any troops under any circumstances 
to the operation in Iraq (Germany, France, Belgium and Spain). 167 Considering that, as 
of early October 2004, only about forty soldiers were in place in Iraq contributing to the 
mission, I would say that 3,000 is an awful large number to be hoping for. 168 If this 
number is ever reached, it is likely that most of these troops will be American. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSION 
What does the evidence show about U.S./NATO relations? Furthermore, what 
does this mean to the future viability and the very survival of the transatlantic alliance? 
The concluding chapter will address these questions in two ways. First, a short summary 
of each mission will be examined in this chapter in order to find any implications that 
U.S. contributions have to the future of the transatlantic alliance. Second, I will address 
how this thesis fits into the past literature pertaining to the future of NATO. 
KOSOVO: 
In the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, the United States and its NATO allies 
agreed that NATO should provide a peacekeeping force in order to ensure the peace and 
security of Kosovo. NATO created KFOR whose mission was to build an environment 
in which all citizens, despite their ethnic background, could live in peace and an 
environment in which democracy can begin to grow. The evidence presented in chapter 
2 suggest that the United States was instrumental in the development of KFOR, and at the 
outset of the mission, contributed more troops and monetary assistance than any other 
ally. This mission is important because it is one of the earlier post-Cold War crises that 
the alliance faced. The evidence also suggests that this mission, either be indirectly or 
directly, has affected the way the United States works within and outside of the alliance 
and in future endeavors. The U.S. contributions to the air war and peacekeeping mission 
in Kosovo cannot be emphasized enough. Without the contributions of the United States, 
it could be argued that Milosevic would not have come to the bargaining table. More 
recently, the United States has begun to draw down its forces in Kosovo to support 
89 
military action elsewhere. President Bush has suggested that the Europeans, more 
specifically the European Union, take on the burden of the peacekeeping mission in 
Kosovo. 
What implications do the U.S. contributions to KFOR have on the future of the 
alliance? The evidence suggests that in order for the alliance to remain viable and 
vibrant, the United States must continue in its leadership role because most of its 
European allies lack the resources to contribute significantly militarily to future NATO 
missions. At the outset of the KFOR mission the United States was the leading 
contributor, both militarily and monetarily. However, the United States has begun to 
reduce its troop levels in the Balkans. This could be happening for a number of reasons, 
but the evidence in this thesis suggests two. First, the United States is retreating from the 
alliance and would rather work unilaterally or with a coalition that accepts being under 
the command of U.S. officers. Second, it could be that the Bush Administrations foreign 
policy is to work unilaterally so that it will be easier to accomplish their goals globally. 
Whatever the reason, the next few years are important to the future of NATO as a viable 
security alliance. 
AFGHANISTAN: 
After Operation Enduring Freedom, in which the United States, Great Britain and 
Afghan forces (the Northern Alliance) dispelled Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from 
Afghanistan, NATO took over the ISAF mission from the United Nations. ISAF's role in 
Afghanistan is to help develop the conditions in Afghanistan in which it can enjoy a 
representative government and a self-sustaining peace. The United States contributed 
very little to the ISAF mission, instead focusing on the hunting down of remnants of the 
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Taliban regime and al-Qaeda terrorist network. Initially the United States wanted to keep 
the NATO mission separate from the continuing Operation Enduring Freedom. More 
recently however, the United States has begun to pressure its NATO allies to combine the 
ISAF mission with Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States may have asked its 
allies to combine these two missions to make them more efficient, or perhaps to reduce 
the number of troops that are deployed in the area of responsibility and redeploy them in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Whatever the reason for the United States' change 
of heart, one thing is evident, and that is that the United States has begun to retreat 
somewhat from the alliance in favor of unilateral action with coalitions that are willing to 
work with the United States. This was evident during the initial stages of Operation 
Enduring Freedom when NATO offered resources to the United States. Since the United 
States did not wan the war to be conducted through NATO's military structure, the 
United States instead compiled a coalition that was willing to allow the U.S. to remain in 
command of all combat operations. 
Also of note during Operation Enduring Freedom was the fact that the United 
States did not use the resources that NATO was ready to provide. Many reasons of why 
the United States would do this can be derived. However, the evidence suggests that the 
United States did not want to work within the complex military structure of NATO's 
consensus decision-making process. 
Iraq: 
After Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi Intern Government asked NA TO for help 
in implementing a training mission that would help Iraq provide for its own security as 
well as bolster new security institutions that have been created. The NATO Training 
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Implementation Mission (NTIM-1) is involved in the training, equipping and technical 
assistance of Iraqi senior security and defense officials. The United States will bear the 
brunt of the operation contributing most of the 400 officers as well as most of the 1,200 
protection force deployed in Iraq. Even though the United States is contributing the most 
to the NTIM-1 mission, it is doing so because other alliance members have refused to 
contribute at all. The evidence in chapter 4 suggests that NATO is merely a vehicle for 
the NTIM-1 and the rift that began when the United States commenced Operation Iraqi 
Freedom is still very much alive and well. The difficulty in this mission is that unlike the 
missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, new developments occur daily in regards to 
NATO's commitment to Iraq. Furthermore, U.S. commitments to the training mission in 
Iraq are not what strengthens the transatlantic partnership, but instead weakens it because 
some European allies will not contribute to the mission. In the end, the United States was 
able to convince the alliance to implement the training mission in Iraq and is led by U.S. 
Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who also commands the U.S.-led coalition still 
battling insurgents in Iraq. 169 
What threat? 
Walt asserted that the lack of an external threat would lead to the demise of 
NAT0. 170 However, the evidence in chapter 2 shows otherwise. Despite the lack of an 
external threat, a decision to intervene and subsequently be involved in a peacekeeping 
mission was reached by NATO. Furthermore, Waltz contends that an alliance will not 
outlive the threats that it was originally created to defend against, and an alliance that 
does not have a common threat there is no reason for alliance members to cooperate. 171 
Again, the evidence in this thesis suggests otherwise and the alliance has outlived the 
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Soviet threat allowing it to evolve in the post-Cold War era. The evidence also suggests 
that Mearsheimer's argument that the Soviet Union was the glue that held NATO 
together and without the Soviet Union the United States would abandon the continent 
altogether appears to be incorrect. 172 To the contrary the United States was a leading 
nation in the implementation of both the air war to dispel Milosevic and the subsequent 
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Furthermore, since 9/11, terrorism has become the 
external threat to alliance members. Chapter 2 does suggest that Duffield's argument that 
NATO continues to be the leading security organization in Europe may be a good 
assessment of NATO even in the post-9/11 environment. 173 In accordance with 
Duffield's assessment of NATO in this new security environment, the evidence suggests 
that it has undertaken "new activities and mission." However, the evidence in chapters 
three and four suggest that these new activities and missions may be at the very heart of 
the trouble that NATO faces. 
Expansion: 
The second wave of literature dealt mostly with the eastern expansion of the 
alliance and its subsequent consequences. Critics of NATO expansion asserted that 
expansion would weaken an already fragile alliance and make decision-making more 
difficult. The evidence in these cases does suggest that consensus building and decision 
making in NATO may have become more difficult since its first and second round of 
expansion. The United States found it very difficult to carry out the air war in Kosovo 
because of the complex military structure of the alliance. This may be the biggest 
implications that this chapter suggests. Decision-making and consensus building did 
become difficult, and the subsequent NATO missions under examination in this thesis 
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suggest that the United States went outside of NATO's structure to avoid such problems. 
When these critics of NATO expansion made the argument that consensus building 
would be more difficult after the expansion of NATO, they probably did not foresee the 
trouble would come from the more tested members. The evidence also implies that 
NATO's new Strategic Concept that was adopted in 1991 may not, as Brown asserts, be 
the correct strategy for the future of the alliance. Brown argued that the new missions 
could be highly problematic and could undermine the alliance as a whole. 174 The new 
mission in Afghanistan suggests that this may be true. Even though the alliance has 
expanded the mission outside of Kabul and increased the number of troops deployed in 
the area, NA TO has found it difficult to get alliance members to commit the necessary 
troops and resources. This is the reason NATO took over the operation from the United 
Nations in the first place. Although NATO has since gotten past this problem, it cannot 
be mentioned enough the importance that this has to the future of the alliance. If NATO 
continues along this same path, it is likely that it will lose its prestige and new leaders 
(such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq) will no longer ask for NATO's assistance. 
Wallander asserted that the alliance would be able to evolve and remain viable 
because of its internal political structure. 175 The evidence suggests that the alliance has 
been able to adapt from a collective defense alliance and has been able to implement new 
peacekeeping missions. However, it also suggests that NATO's complex consensus 
decision making may be the eventual downfall of the alliance, especially in light of its 
expansion eastward and the subsequent rift over Iraq. 
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Post-9/11: 
The evidence in this thesis suggests that during Operation Allied Force, KFOR, 
Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF there was a large gap between the United States 
and its allied partners in terms of defense capabilities (including space-based 
surveillance, large deck carrier operations, strategic airlift, radar-defeating stealth aircraft, 
mid-altitude reconnaissance and strike capabilities during times when visibility was 
reduced). Calleo asserted that the future of the alliance depends greatly on the closing of 
this gap. The evidence that was presented in this thesis shows that this is not the case, 
and if Calleo' s assessment of the alliance is correct, the future of the alliance is not 
bright. 176 In the post-9/11 environment, in which terrorism may have become the new 
external threat facing the alliance, European leaders do not feel the same imminent threat 
that the United States feels. This further division is yet another reason why the United 
States appears to have begun to retreat from the alliance. President Bush contended 
during his 2000 presidential campaign that he wanted to reduce the number of U.S. troops 
deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO mission. Once elected, President Bush 
initially backed away from this and decided that it was important to the alliance to 
maintain its current capabilities. However, the number of U.S. troops deployed in 
support of KFOR has been reduced time and time again from the original commitment of 
about 5,700 to about 1,000. Furthermore, since 9/11, President Bush has asked its NATO 
Partners to take on a greater burden in Kosovo so that U.S. resources could be redirected 
to Afghanistan and eventually Iraq. This development could be seen as both good and 
had for the future of the alliance. 
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Critics would argue that the United States is retreating from the European 
continent. This also suggests that a strategic divergence is occurring between the United 
States and Europe which may become to large too overcome. However, proponents may 
argue that NATO has come to the aid of the United States by providing resources so that 
the U.S. could pull troops out of Kosovo in order to deploy them elsewhere. It is difficult 
to determine which of these arguments is correct. The evidence since 9/11 however 
suggests that the former, not the latter, may be the answer. Still even though a division 
has occurred over the United States' projecting military power in Iraq, alliance members 
are still consulting with each other to determine the right course of action to be taken in 
this environment. 
The evidence these missions present lends credence to the claim that the alliance 
may become just a shell and lack the viability that it had in the past. Although the United 
States was an active member in the setup and implementation ofKFOR, the data suggests 
that the United States began to withdraw from the alliance. This can be seen in chapter 3 
in which the United States did not contribute much to ISAF. The lessons learned from 
the Balkans quickly carried over to the new missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
IMPLICATIONS: 
The evidence in this thesis suggests that the transatlantic alliance is at a very 
fragile point in its history. The Bush Administration has made it clear that they are 
willing to work unilaterally or with coalition partners that accept the fact that the United 
States is in charge. It is also evident that the United States would much rather keep its 
own troops under the command of U.S. officers, rather than under the command of 
NATO officers. From Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq, it is evident that the United States 
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is the leader in the alliance. Despite the objections of the war in Iraq, the United States 
still has been able to convince its NA TO allies to participate in the training mission in 
Iraq. Recent developments in Iraq show that France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Greece 
and Luxembourg have all gone along with the decision to set up NTIM-I. These 
countries have, however, made it clear that they will not permit their officers to be 
stationed in Iraq. This is a disturbing development which could lead to even further 
fragmentation within the alliance. NATO's top military officer, U.S. General James 
Jones has said: 
"It is important that once the alliance gets involved in an operation, it is 
important that all allies support the operation. With nine or ten or eleven 
countries in the alliance who will not send forces to Iraq to participate in 
the mission, the burden falls then on the remaining fifteen or sixteen 
nations or fourteen nations to shoulder that burden. I hope that it is a one-
time event, because it really will be a limiting factor in the long term in 
terms of generating forces and successive rotations. This is disturbing."177 
At the same time that France was deciding not to participate in the training mission, 
French Foreign Minister Michel Bamier said: 
"We all know what positions our different countries held in the period that 
led up to the current situation developing. But today we must tum to the 
future. France, and Europe, are read~ to do so. We have a collective duty 
to put an end to instability in Iraq."17 
Two conclusions that have derived from the data collected in this thesis may lead 
us to an answer on NATO's future. First, it is evident that the United States is far 
superior in terms of military resources and technology than its European partners. This 
gap must be closed if European leaders expect to participate in NA TO missions in the 
same capacity that the United States does. If the gap continues to widen, why would the 
United States bother with the alliance at all if it is only going to cause headaches 
convincing its allies to participate in a mission? Second, NATO must amend the 
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Washington Treaty to eliminate the consensus building decision-making process. If ten 
or eleven countries want to form a coalition under the NATO flag in order to implement 
some type of mission, they should be able to do that. Instead the alliance could be used 
for consultation for a country that makes the decision to use force. For example, in Iraq 
there were about sixteen NATO members that joined the United States during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Why should these countries be prevented from working under NATO 
leadership? If members can let go of old rivalries (the rift over Iraq per se ), then there is 
no reason why the alliance cannot survive the post-September 11th environment. 
One thing is clear, the United States continues to be the leader in NATO. 
Furthermore, the data proposes that without the leadership and contributions of the 
United States, the alliance would not be able to carry out the types of missions that they 
currently are. I would argue that without the U.S. contributions to the alliance, NATO 
may have already disbanded (especially when considering the developments in the 
European Union). Additionally, without the United States, the expansion eastward may 
never have happened leaving Eastern Europe prone to instability. Smaller member 
countries, particularly newer members, have begun to bandwagon with the United States 
in the war on terrorism. If Germany, France and other countries continue their animosity 
towards the hegemonic power, there is a chance that we could see the end of the fifty-five 
year alliance. Maybe Mearsheimer, Waltz and Morganthau were right in their assessment 
of alliance formation and dissolution, especially in the case of NATO. These scholars did 
not put a timetable on the demise of an alliance, and perhaps it takes certain types of 
crises for member countries to realize the diverging opinions of European and American 
leaders in terms of the international environment and alliances. 
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The evidence in this thesis suggests that Walt's balance-of-power theory of 
alliance formation may be a good explanation of NATO's Future. Walt argued that the 
decline of the Soviet threat would lead NATO members to devote less effort to deterring 
a direct military challenge, alliance cohesion would decline and bargaining within the 
alliance would become more intense. 179 States may form alliances because they do not 
want others to achieve a dominant position on a global level, and NATO may have 
endured for this very reason. This might be especially true if European leaders believe 
that, without the framework of an alliance, the United States may become isolationists. 
All of these findings are limited due to the case study approach employed. One 
limitation is that the mission is Iraq is fairly new, and only time will tell if the alliance is 
able to heal from the wounds that it suffered since the United States attacked Iraq. 
Another limitation is that except for a brief period of time during KFOR, the Bush 
Administration has been in power. Perhaps the Bush Administration differs from its 
European allies in their views of the global environment. Perhaps President George W. 
Bush is attempting to heal old wound within the alliance by asking for more help in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The answer to NATO's future will be played out and answered in the 
next few years. 
Despite these limitations, the evidence presented here suggests that the future of 
NATO is still in question and the transatlantic relationship may be in dire strait. Recently 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that the alliance was "alive and 
kicking" and "NATO is not terminally ill."180 The evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests otherwise, maybe "kicking to stay alive," is a better description. Whatever the 
case, the rift that was created by the war in Iraq and the subsequent dissent within the 
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alliance concerning Turkey's defense and the NITM-I is far from over. Unless the ties 
are mended, the future of NATO as a "viable" and "legitimate" alliance will be in doubt. 
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MBN 
MBS 
MBE 
MTA 
NAC 
NATO 
NTIM-1 
OSCE 
PR Ts 
UNSCR 
APPENDIX 
Abbreviations 
Area of Responsibility 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
International Security Assistance Force 
The Kosovo Force 
Multinational Brigade Centre 
Multinational Brigade Northeast 
Multinational Brigade Southwest 
Multinational Brigade East 
Military Technical Agreement 
North Atlantic Council 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
Agreements and Definitions 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council CEAPC)-this is a forum in which NATO member and 
partner (non-NATO members) countries discuss political and security-related issues and 
develop cooperation in a wide range of areas. 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF}-was established to help develop 
conditions in Afghanistan where it can enjoy a representative government and a self-
sustaining peace. 
Military Technical Agreement-was an agreement between the International Security 
Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia. 
NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM-I}-the purpose of the training 
mission is to train, equip and provide technical assistance to Iraqi senior security and 
defense officials. 
North Atlantic Council (NAC)-the North Atlantic Council is the most important 
decision-making body within NATO. It brings together high-level representatives of each 
member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. 
In sum, it provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues 
affecting their security. 
120 
Operation Allied Force- by use of air strikes, the military objective was to degrade and 
damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) 
had used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo. This was a NATO 
mission, under the command of NATO. 
Operation Display Deterrence-the aim of this mission was to contribute to the defense 
of Turkey, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding basis of the 
Alliance in case of an attack by Iraq. 
Operation Enduring Freedom-a U.S.-led coalition attack against Taliban and al-Qaeda 
forces in Afghanistan. Although NATO implemented Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, this was not a NATO operation. It was however mandated by NATO and the 
United Nations. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom-was a U.S.-led coalition attack against Saddam Hussein's 
regime in Iraq to dispose of the Iraqi leader. This was not a NATO mission and was not 
mandated by either NATO or the United Nations. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-this organization 
provides for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict 
rehabilitation in Europe. 
Rambouillet Accords-are a 3-year interim agreement that will provide democratic self-
govemment, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo. 
The Kosovo Force (KFOR)-mission was to build an environment in which all citizens 
can live in peace and democracy can begin to grow. 
Washington Treaty-the founding charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
signed on April 3, 1949. 
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